The Next-Generation Expeditionary Air Force
Research Report
The Next-Generation Expeditionary Air Force
Jeffrey Hukill
Kristal Alfonso
Scott Johnson
John Conway
Copyright Date: Feb. 1, 2012
Published by: Air University Press
Pages: 49
OPEN ACCESS
https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep13901
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  1. Front Matter
    Front Matter (pp. i-ii)
  2. Table of Contents
    Table of Contents (pp. iii-iv)
  3. Memorandum from the Chief of Staff of the Air Force to AFRI
    Memorandum from the Chief of Staff of the Air Force to AFRI (pp. v-vi)
  4. About the Authors
    About the Authors (pp. vii-viii)
  5. Executive Summary
    Executive Summary (pp. ix-x)
  6. Introduction
    Introduction (pp. 1-6)

    On 20 November 2008, the chief of staff, United States Air Force (CSAF) tasked the Air Force Research Institute (AFRI) to examine the current expeditionary air and space forces (EAF) construct to see if it was properly engineered to deal with challenges facing the Air Force today and in the foreseeable future.* Specifically, the research effort was to determine if the current air and space expeditionary force (AEF) construct was properly tailored to provide the flexibility and scalability essential for dealing with non–phase III operations. It had to be adaptable across all scenarios involving military operations; it had to...

  7. Organize-Train-Equip: Observations and Recommendations
    Organize-Train-Equip: Observations and Recommendations (pp. 7-14)

    A recurring question heard during the majority of the research interviews was “Who really controls the AEF processes?” There are multiple organizations involved in the sourcing process. These organizations include Headquarters Air Force (HAF), force providers (FP), major commands (MAJCOM), Air Force Personnel Center (AFPC), and supported CCDRs’ Air Force components. No one argues the need for all these organizations to be involved. However, it is not clear who has the final say once a decision has to be made. Even when a clear policy is provided, at times it is ignored. One air staff member put this issue into...

  8. Force Presentation Model: Observation and Recommendation
    Force Presentation Model: Observation and Recommendation (pp. 15-20)

    The next phase of expeditionary operations deals with the organization of USAF operating forces to enable effective measurement of Air Force capability. As in the previous section, the term operating force is defined according to JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.

    There is a gap between the organize, train, and equip phase and the force generation phase. The Air Force does not have an effective way to describe in quantifiable terms its total operating force capability or the amount committed in support of CCDR needs. The Air Force does not have an effective force presentation...

  9. Force Generation and Presentation: Observation and Recommendation
    Force Generation and Presentation: Observation and Recommendation (pp. 21-24)

    The demands of the Phase IV and IW operating environments created the need for the AEF process to do things it was never designed to do. The AEF process was designed to support CCDR requirements by presenting force capabilities through UTCs. UTCs described capabilities designed to support expeditionary operations. UTCs were not created to man permanent or enduring requirements. However, that is exactly how they are being used. Deployed locations have become more like permanent bases. The Air Force does not have an alternate way to man permanent/enduring deployed locations, so it uses UTCs. Using UTCs as an alternate personnel...

  10. Training, Education, and Strategic Communication: Observation and Recommendations
    Training, Education, and Strategic Communication: Observation and Recommendations (pp. 25-30)

    There appears to be a lack of understanding about the AEF process across the Air Force, from the senior officer level down to the unit and individual levels. This stems from challenges in education, training, and strategic communication processes. These difficulties have been part of the AEF process since its inception, as the AEF was intended to mean different things to different users. When a process has multiple meanings, misperceptions will inevitably arise, which are compounded by poor communication and education. For example, some regarded the AEF process as mainly a means to schedule “iron” or combat aircraft. Others marketed...

  11. Conclusion
    Conclusion (pp. 31-32)

    Today’s operating environment has revealed weaknesses in the way the Air Force presents forces and capabilities in support of CCDR requirements. The weaknesses include the AEF not being designed to support all scenarios involving military operations, excessive flexibility of the AEF, unit and leadership teaming, and assessment of contributions to joint operations. The observations in this paper touch the heart of the problems created by these weaknesses. The recommendations are an attempt to provide the framework needed to produce the desired end state of a measurable and sustainable expeditionary process that meets combatant commanders’ requirements across the range of military...

  12. Notes
    Notes (pp. 32-32)
  13. List of Acronyms
    List of Acronyms (pp. 33-34)
  14. Back Matter
    Back Matter (pp. 34-37)