Rethinking the QDR
Research Report
Rethinking the QDR: The Case for a Persistent Defense Review
P. Dean Patterson
Lenny J. Richoux
Copyright Date: Jan. 1, 2009
Published by: Air University Press
Pages: 83
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https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep13927
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  1. Front Matter
    Front Matter (pp. i-ii)
  2. Disclaimer
    Disclaimer (pp. ii-iv)
  3. Table of Contents
    Table of Contents (pp. v-vi)
  4. Foreword
    Foreword (pp. vii-x)
    Lenny J. Richoux

    Consider the millions of man-hours spent by talented, highly educated military officers, the number of contractors who are anxiously awaiting a chance to get in the fight, or the political appointees who are nervously awaiting the next step. Sound like someone planning a war? In a way, it is. Legislation mandating a DOD quadrennial defense review (QDR) was passed in 1997, yielding three detailed, thoughtful reports about the next vector our armed services should take. The services took on a war-like posture as each one approached. The next QDR, due to the Congress nine months after the next presidential inauguration,...

  5. About the Authors
    About the Authors (pp. xi-xiv)
  6. Abstract
    Abstract (pp. xv-xvi)
  7. Preface and Acknowledgments
    Preface and Acknowledgments (pp. xvii-xviii)
  8. Chapter 1 Introduction
    Chapter 1 Introduction (pp. 1-4)

    Legislation mandating a Department of Defense (DOD) quadrennial defense review (QDR) was passed in 1997. Since 1997 the DOD has developed three detailed, thoughtful reports about the direction our armed services should take. The next QDR, due to Congress in 2010 along with the next president’s first budget, is already under way—months before the 2008 presidential election. A look back at service budgets that resulted after past QDRs tells the story: each service ends up maintaining its fair share (percentage) of the defense budget. The recent fiscal year (FY) 2009 presidential budget shows the services’ apportionment basically detailed as...

  9. Chapter 2 Background
    Chapter 2 Background (pp. 5-12)

    The Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act of 1986 was the most far reaching of defense reorganizations since the National Security Act of 1947. In 1986 the Packard Commission made far-reaching recommendations to reorganize the Defense Department. In response, the DOD initiated the 1989 defense management review, which outlined ways to improve acquisition strategies and oversight during the George H. W. Bush presidential administration. This study resulted in the 1991 base force that was framed by then-Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) chairman, Gen Colin Powell, and Defense Secretary Dick Cheney. At the beginning of the Bill Clinton administration, Defense Secretary Les Aspin produced...

  10. Chapter 3 Alternatives for the Next QDR
    Chapter 3 Alternatives for the Next QDR (pp. 13-20)

    With a historical perspective on the evolution of the QDR, this study lays out three alternatives for future reviews and recommends a persistent approach for future reviews. Although the QDR was created by Congress, the current body of legislators appears not to know what to do with the document—possibly resulting from repetitive briefings on future capabilities and stagnant budget allocations between the services.¹ This chapter examines the possibilities of doing away with the QDR, enlarging the QDR to include the entire national security apparatus, or creating a persistent QDR (PQDR). While all three will be introduced and briefly discussed,...

  11. Chapter 4 Recommendation for Implementing a PQDR
    Chapter 4 Recommendation for Implementing a PQDR (pp. 21-30)

    The institutional and organizational momentum of the Pentagon’s planning, programming, and budgeting system will continue well into the future. It has worked well and, blended with a PQDR, may be a simple but effective change to defense planning. Therefore, the legislative mandate for the DOD to conduct a continual or persistent QDR should add to the Pentagon’s budget-driven processes. This study argues for a QDR process that derives from the good work conducted daily by the DOD. The adoption/implementation of a PQDR will cause fewer perturbations for the DOD and will provide incremental inputs and adjustments for defense strategists and...

  12. Chapter 5 Conclusion
    Chapter 5 Conclusion (pp. 31-34)

    After the QDR of 2006 was released, the US Air Force cut its end-strength by 40,000, the US Marine Corps added 27,000, and the Army grew by 56,000 personnel. These major force structure changes did not grow from QDR recommendations. Aside from established PPBE processes, how could major force structure changes have happened outside the QDR process, albeit during wartime? The QDR process should provide for regular off-ramps or opportunities to adjust.

    Note that Congress passed legislation that added new reporting elements for the next QDR in 2010 and for future QDRs. For example, under current rules,the secretary of defense...

  13. Appendix A Legislation Pertaining to QDR Establishment
    Appendix A Legislation Pertaining to QDR Establishment (pp. 35-38)
  14. Appendix B Public Law Pertaining to the QDR
    Appendix B Public Law Pertaining to the QDR (pp. 39-46)
  15. Appendix C Congressional Roles and Missions Panel
    Appendix C Congressional Roles and Missions Panel (pp. 47-48)
  16. Appendix D OSD Capability Portfolio Guidance, Part 1
    Appendix D OSD Capability Portfolio Guidance, Part 1 (pp. 49-50)
  17. Appendix E Potential QDR Service Priorities (Marine Corps and Air Force)
    Appendix E Potential QDR Service Priorities (Marine Corps and Air Force) (pp. 51-56)
  18. Bibliography
    Bibliography (pp. 57-60)
  19. Back Matter
    Back Matter (pp. 61-61)