Space-based systems of various kinds had proven their worth well before the end of the cold war. But it was only during the Persian Gulf War that the enormous multiplier effect of space systems on combat operations became widely recognized. In the immediate aftermath of that conflict, then Air Force chief of staff Gen Merrill A. McPeak went so far as to describe Operation Desert Storm as America’s “first space war.” Military exploitation of space has markedly accelerated during the years since 1991. So has US reliance on the satellite systems that inhabit that immense realm.
Shooting Down a Star:...
What were the motivating factors that influenced and eventually led the United States to develop a nuclear-armed anti-satellite (ASAT) capability in 1963? Although the Air Force investigated space defense weapons systems in the early 1950s, little was done in this area until 1957. The Soviet Union’s launch of the world’s first artificial earth orbiting satellite, Sputnik I, on 4 October 1957 put an exclamation point on the space race. The greatest danger posed by the launch of Sputnik I was not the tiny satellite itself but the demonstration that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) had developed a powerful...
As the SAINT program faded from sight, other events occurred that changed the face of ASAT options. This new approach was a result of a series of high-altitude nuclear tests. The Air Force, under the direction of Joint Task Force-8 (JTF-8), used a “loaned” launch pad and other facilities on Johnston Island in the central Pacific to conduct the tests.⁶ As a result of these experiments, the Air Force Systems Command (AFSC)—a reorganized ARDC—proposed a direct ascent ASAT option under Advanced Development Option 40, Anti-Satellite Program, to DOD on 9 February 1962. These tests, which were a part...
On 12 September 1962, in light of the Starfish Prime test, Schriever combined the direct ascent option—Advanced Development Option 40—and the Fishbowl test results to propose a new ASAT program to Secretary of the Air Force Eugene B. Zuckert. Schriever’s proposal was to deploy nuclear-armed Thors on Johnston Island crewed by Air Defense Command (ADC) personnel. On 27 February 1962, Zuckert and Air Force chief of staff Gen Curtis E. LeMay had helped lay the foundation for congressional support at the Senate’s hearing on DOD appropriations by stressing the need for active defenses against hostile space systems.18 Zuckert...
What motivated the Kennedy administration to pursue such a contentious drive to militarize space given no apparent Soviet space threat? While the USSR had demonstrated its technical ability to launch a satellite into orbit and proved that it could put a payload, civilian or military, into space, US military analysts were concerned primarily about the threat deriving from the use of these launch boosters as ICBMs. Premier Nikita Khruschev’s blustery claims of USSR space prowess and its ability to orbit nuclear weapons caused genuine unease within the US government.26 While many top officials and intelligence experts undoubtedly considered these claims...
The Army was adding an ASAT capability to its Nike-Zeus antiballistic missile (ABM) system. In November 1957 and again in January 1960, the Army proposed to DOD that Nike-Zeus could protect the nation from ICBMs and space threats.32 An ABM system shares many characteristics with an ASAT weapon. Both systems require precise and timely target tracking and guidance systems and a quick reaction or launch capability. Under McNamara’s guidance, the Army, after long debate within DOD and Congress, was given permission to develop Nike-Zeus into an ASAT system.33 The project was code-named Program 505. The Army decided to base Program...
A significant advantage of Program 437 over Nike-Zeus was its use of existing technology and weapons systems. The Air Force’s alternative melded the Thor booster, existing warheads and launch pads, and ADC’s worldwide detection, tracking, communications, and command and control infrastructure into an operational ASAT system. McNamara’s decision to make the Air Force the executive agent for the ASAT system energized Zuckert to move quickly to secure this role and make it an ADC mission.
Secretary Zuckert’s operational concept for the program incorporated two bases, Johnston Island and Vandenberg AFB. The Johnston Island site provided launch pads for two Thor...
However, Program 437 had several limitations. ADC needed to ensure that launch crew proficiency remained high due to the nature of the 10th ADS mission but had limited resources (principally available Thors) for doing so. ADC planned to conduct three combat training launches (CTL) a year from Johnston Island to maintain the reliability of the program.56 These CTLs provided a way to test the ADC crew readiness and test modifications to the ASAT systems. ADC policy was to have each of its three crews carry out a CTL mission. Each crew rotated to Johnston Island for a 90-day temporary duty....
Details about Program 437 were completely unknown to the US public until the fall of 1964. On 17 September 1964, President Lyndon B. Johnson, during a reelection campaign trip to Sacramento, California, disclosed that the United States had developed an ASAT capability to intercept a satellite that might be carrying a weapon that threatened US national security.64 The day after Johnson’s revelation Secretary McNamara announced that the United States had conducted test launches of ASAT weapons that successfully had either intercepted orbiting satellites, or at least had passed within the weapon’s effective kill radius. He noted that the ASAT system...
The 10th ADS’s mission soon underwent a radical shift in direction. On 23 May 1963, AFSC directed the Space Systems Division to study the possibility of using Program 437 to act as a satellite inspection system. Program 437AP (advanced payload) would provide the ability to examine an orbiting satellite. This new program was vital if the president needed more information to determine whether an orbiting satellite constituted a threat to US national security and vital national interests and, thus, should be destroyed. Intelligence agencies, like the CIA, could look at a photograph to see if the space vehicle was an...
Despite increasing Soviet space activity in the 1960s, the Air Force’s Program 437 did not target any specific space threats other than a hypothetical FOBS or MOBS deployment. The 10th ADS mission would soon get a surprising boost from the CIA. Its 1966 National Intelligence Estimate projected that the Soviets had conducted several test FOBS launches, but the CIA was not convinced the launches would lead to a MOBS capability.77 The following year, the CIA revealed that the USSR had been experimenting with a FOBS capability as early as 1965. The agency’s analysts concluded that the Soviets would likely deploy...
In addition to dwindling numbers and the age of available Thor boosters in the late 1960s, the vulnerability of the launch site to weather and other natural disasters helped to doom Program 437. The Thor boosters stood alert on open launch pads, unprotected from the harsh environment and strong Pacific storms or other natural disasters. Over time the rocket bodies and launch support equipment were susceptible to the corrosive effects of the heat, humidity, and salt-water spray. The 10th ADG began experiencing frequent failures of launch equipment. For example, on 22 March 1969, a Thor on alert was declared inoperable...
In the past two decades, the US military and civilian communities have become ever more dependent upon space-based reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance, warning, communications, navigation, meteorological, and other systems. Although the US military is not solely reliant on space systems for fighting a war, winning a major theater conflict would prove more costly without them. The space systems used in the early 1960s were relatively crude and few in number. Had the United States lost a satellite then, its war-fighting capabilities would not have been seriously weakened because of the limited reliance on space systems. Today, the Air Force, other US...
How susceptible space systems are to attack depends on two primary factors: their orbit and the capabilities of individual nations or organizations to attack those systems. Satellites may be in low earth,92 sun-synchronous,93 geostationary,94 geosynchronous,95 or Molniya96 orbits. Altitudes for these orbits vary significantly. The lower the orbital altitude the more vulnerable a space vehicle would be. Nations trying to establish an ASAT capability would need to select key targets and assess their ability to attack satellites given the orbit. Depending on its booster capability, a country might have a limited range of targets. Some countries may have the capacity...
In assessing the potential threat, we must examine which elements nations or groups will need to effect attacks on their enemies’ space assets. They will need a means of delivery––they will, at a minimum, need a booster with a range and altitude at least similar to that of the Thor; and they will need a device capable of producing sufficiently strong EMP effect to disable or destroy the intended target. Unless such a nation merely wants to make a random attack on any orbiting satellite, it will need an accurate and timely detection, tracking, and targeting system. This capability...
Some analysts believe the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea poses the biggest threat to the United States because of its continuing efforts to expand its ballistic missile capabilities and acquire weapons of mass destruction.101 North Korea has several medium range ballistic missiles that have operating capabilities close to or better than those of the Thor. The North Koreans not only produce these missiles and have them in their active military inventory but export them along with support equipment and technology. North Korea’s need for financial resources has forced not only an increase in sales of existing missile-related materiel but has...
Another budding missile power is India. Unlike North Korea’s reengineering of Soviet missile technology, India’s ballistic missile programs are based almost exclusively on its domestic technology and industrial resources. Its missile program is grounded in its determination to defend itself against Pakistan (principally) and the PRC (secondarily).
The Indian government relies on its indigenous resources to develop and produce its ballistic missiles. This strategy allows India to maintain the autonomy of its missile and space programs. Hence, India is in a better position to pursue future advances in both programs free from delays resulting from disruption of access to external...
Experts concerned about proliferation also keep a watchful eye on the Middle East (or Southwest Asia). Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen has reported that the Middle East has one of the highest concentrations of new missile programs in the world.124 Iran is heavily involved in developing missiles and has several active ballistic missile programs that may give the Iranians an ASAT capability.
Iran first acquired Scud missiles from Libya and North Korea during its 1980–89 conflict with Iraq. Iran has since purchased or acquired technical assistance from several countries, notably North Korea. The Iranians have Scud B and...
The Peoples’ Republic of China is a nuclear power aggressively pursuing the development of intermediate range and intercontinental ballistic missiles. China is simultaneously expanding its space program. The PRC not only pursues these programs to strengthen its own military forces and to pursue a national goal of becoming an international space power but also to assist other nations (friendly to the PRC) in these same quests. China has maintained and operated a space launch capability for years. The PRC has developed and deployed liquid- and solid-fuelled ballistic missiles and boosters that exceed the Thor’s abilities. Some of these missiles have...
The third element needed for an operational ASAT system (in addition to adequate space boosters and deployable ASAT weapons, namely, nuclear warheads) is a space launch infrastructure: launch facilities and a tracking capability. Any nation attempting to deploy an ASAT system must have the ability to sustain prelaunch preparations of an ASAT booster, track the target, launch the vehicle, and observe the interception. Some countries may want to achieve a continuous 24-hour launch capability or be able to rapidly assemble a vehicle for launch against a single orbiting target. To conduct a satellite interception mission, a nation must have sufficient...
All four nations discussed above—North Korea, India, Iran, and the PRC—have the potential space boosters and have demonstrated the ability and willingness to develop nuclear devices. They realistically could, in the next few years, field a low-cost ASAT weapon system powerful enough to severely damage or destroy a target satellite. Such an ASAT device could be a conventional weapon. However, the proliferation of nuclear weapons increases the likelihood that many nations, especially the DPRK, India, the PRC, and Iran, will be capable of producing and supplying makes the latter technology the more likely choice for states seeking to...
The space control and counterspace missions are hotly debated issues today within the US Space Command, DOD, and the Congress. Actions continue within the government to explore space control concepts. For example, the Joint Staff’s Joint Requirements Oversight Council has approved a requirements document that outlines key performance parameters to consider in developing a space control capability.147 As the United States relies more on space systems as war-fighting assets, it will need to devote more resources to protecting those systems against an enemy ASAT system. Although it recognizes the threat of direct-ascent ASAT weapons, the discussion and analysis of this...
