The 1991 Persian Gulf War produced a radical change in the relative importance of the theater ballistic missile (TBM) threat. TBMs, regarded by many military leaders as merely a tactical nuisance when not carrying weapons of mass destruction (WMD), suddenly became weapons of terror with the potential for disproportionate political and diplomatic ramifications. Though United States (US) deterrence appears to have persuaded the Iraqi government to refrain from employing WMDs, conventionally equipped Scuds created a political crisis for the coalition when Iraq attacked Israel with Scuds. A single conventionally armed Scud also produced the greatest number of US fatalities of...
There are two overt functions of ballistic missiles: to create fear and to destroy objects or people. Historically, the importance of the former to the populace of democracies and the potential of the latter to the civilian and military leaders are the mechanisms that create the necessity to provide some defense from ballistic missiles. Indeed, these very mechanisms and the relative ease with which a nation can affect terror with cheap and available technology, create strong incentives for third world countries to employ missiles to leverage larger and stronger forces. Moreover, cheap and available technology allows proliferation of TBMs and...
Chapter 2 presented milestones that led to the current modern TBM threat and service philosophies to deal with that threat. A historical treatment leads to several questions that are addressed in this chapter. Since TMD is a process, not an event, this chapter presents a variety of solutions that, in the spirit of synergy and jointness, should be mixed together to increase their effectiveness. However, it is necessary to point out that the historical legacy of World War II Army Air Forces attack operations against V-1 and V-2 sites is now addressed in Joint Publication (JP) 3-01.5, Doctrine for Joint...
Chapter 3 introduced the current TBM threat, the military and political rationale for defending against the threat, and acquainted the reader with the core and other primary weapons systems considered for joint TMD. This treatment certainly makes no dispute that a joint multilayered approach is required for increased safety and political leverage in a TBM and WMD environment. However, this chapter emphasizes the USAF current and near-term approach to TMD and antimissile actions.
This chapter evaluates the USAF options to distill four TMD and antimissile implications and presents a brief comparison of the BMDO core weapons systems plus attack operations....
Chapter 4 examines the USAF options discussed in chapter 3, distilling four implications of the present and near-term TMD and antimissile situation. The advantages of AO and its interface with BMC4I show the critical importance of the role of the USAF in providing AO to help reduce the impact of the near-term antimissile capabilities gap. While building on chapter 2’s historical evidence of the necessity for AO to reduce US TBM/WMD vulnerability, chapter 3’s justification for TMD and detailing of the BMDO FoS, and chapter 4’s comparisons, this final chapter addresses the implications of the TMD and antimissile situation through...
