A repercussion of the collapse of Communism is a dramatic increase in regional conflicts and associated United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations.¹ Since the beginning of 1992 new peacekeeping missions were created in the Balkans, Cambodia, Somalia and Mozambique. Indeed, during the past four years more peacekeeping operations were created than in the previous 43-year history of the United Nations.² During the zero-sum game of the cold war, the superpowers were reluctant to provide direct support of peacekeeping operations as their respective efforts would automatically arouse suspicion and mistrust of nonaligned powers.³ In fact, during the first 45 years of the...

Although the majority of peacekeeping operations occur under UN auspices, peacekeeping was not created by the UN Charter. Consequently, the development of peacekeeping was evolutionary and the term has come to mean many things, especially as applied in the non-UN context. In fact, one peacekeeping expert proclaims: “Non-UN peacekeeping has come to mean whatever those applying it have wished it to mean.”¹ Even so, UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali recently stated: “Peace-keeping can rightly be called the invention of the United Nations.” In fact, peacekeeping was the brainchild of Prime Minister Lester Pearson of Canada and Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold and developed...

The role of air power in peacekeeping is auxiliary and its use should ultimately improve the chances for success. Specifically, air power must support both the general peacekeeping principles and the specific objectives of an operation.

A review of the peacekeeping principles reveals that the strategic contributions of air power fall under the principles of “international approval and support” and “effective military support.” First, the contributions of US air power for international recognition can be significant. As the sole remaining superpower, US willingness to use valuable air power assets reflects an important commitment both financially and materially to UN operations.¹...

Any recommendation for the use of air power in peacekeeping must focus on the “art of the possible.” These recommendations assume the relative importance of peacekeeping to the US military will not become greater than an ancillary role. The US, as the sole remaining superpower, will not significantly organize, train, or equip forces based on peacekeeping participation—for it is always feasible to adapt conventionally trained forces for peacekeeping, but the reverse is not true. Furthermore, the international climate requires a variety of military forces to promote lasting peace and security—peacekeeping is only a part of the peace process....

The resurgence of United Nations credibility, coupled with the United States’ position as the world leader, makes future US peacekeeping a “given.” The problem now facing policymakers is to determine how military forces can best participate. How often have we seen editorials calling for the use of air power to solve peacekeeping problems in Bosnia? These suggestions, with visions of Desert Storm efficiency, tend to ignore the consequences of turning a given peacekeeping operation into a peace enforcement operation, and they fundamentally misunderstand the true role of air power in peacekeeping. In contrast to these misperceptions, this analysis concludes air...