During the last decade, in large part because of the dynamic nature of operations during Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom, recognition of the importance of developing new capabilities to meet the ever-changing threats our military forces face has grown. As a result, the Department of Defense (DoD) has undertaken operational and technology demonstration projects to test new technologies and systems outside the traditional acquisition process. Many of these systems involve unmanned vehicles and some unmanned aircraft systems (UASs). In 2000, the DoD had fewer than 50 unmanned aircraft in its inventory; by 2012, it had more than 7,100,...

Over decades, DoD has developed a structured and deliberate approach for the way it acquires new systems, which is formalized in the DAS and the 5000 series of DoD instructions. However, the exigencies of recent military operations have led DoD to develop new technology and acquire and field new systems without going through the steps the defense acquisition process generally requires. While near-term requirements drove such acquisition decisions, these decisions have long-term consequences. Rapid acquisition without a fully developed plan for how the new systems will be sustained over time may well diminish operational effectiveness. A potent example of such...

We will begin by discussing the general ideas that should guide UAS training—the trainingconcept. Then, we will consider how the parts identified in the concept fit together into a conceptual structure for that training—a trainingframeworkdesigned to enhance combat power and other operational capabilities. Note that the termUAScan be misleading. In fact, there is not a single UAS but rather a family of aircraft that share the common feature that they fly without a pilot on board.¹ These aircraft have very different personnel and training requirements. The vast majority of UASs support ground operations,...

For more than a decade, UAS training has concentrated on preparing UAS pilots and payload operators to support ongoing operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. This remained true in 2012 and 2013, and the services continue to evolve how best to use these systems and integrate them into ongoing operations. With the operations in Afghanistan winding down, the services must now integrate all facets of UAS training, including the infrastructure for training addressed in Appendix C, into a largely CONUS-based inventory of UASs that continues to grow, even as real-time operations continue for some systems.¹ Moreover, operational demands and technical innovations...

DoD has been under some pressure from Congress and such organizations as GAO for the lack of central control and the lack of the development of a joint DoD strategy for training. For example, “DOD Lacks a Comprehensive, Results-Oriented Strategy to Resolve UAS Training Challenges,” was the summary title of a section of a recent GAO report (GAO, 2010a, p. 29). The Joint Unmanned Aircraft System Center of Excellence was established to support the joint operator and the services by facilitating the development and integration of common unmanned aircraft system operating standards, capabilities, concepts, technologies, doctrine, tactics, techniques, procedures, and...