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Performance Evaluation and Army Recruiting

Performance Evaluation and Army Recruiting

James N. Dertouzos
Steven Garber
Copyright Date: 2008
Edition: 1
Published by: RAND Corporation
Pages: 126
  • Book Info
    Performance Evaluation and Army Recruiting
    Book Description:

    Traditional performance metrics, such as number of contracts signed per month per Army recruiter, do not adequately measure recruiter effort, skill, and productivity. The authors develop a "preferred performance metric" that takes into account the difficulty of recruiting different types of youth in various markets and propose short-term changes to the system that would more accurately assess recruiter effort and skill.

    eISBN: 978-0-8330-4582-9
    Subjects: Political Science, Management & Organizational Behavior

Table of Contents

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  1. Front Matter
    (pp. i-ii)
  2. Preface
    (pp. iii-iv)
  3. Table of Contents
    (pp. v-vi)
  4. Figure and Tables
    (pp. vii-viii)
  5. Summary
    (pp. ix-xx)
  6. Acknowledgments
    (pp. xxi-xxii)
  7. Abbreviations
    (pp. xxiii-xxiv)
  8. CHAPTER ONE Introduction
    (pp. 1-4)

    The United States Army has several human resource policies at its disposal to enhance the productivity of its recruiting force. Such policies include recruiter selection and assignment, setting enlistment goals, and rewarding successful recruiters. Recent RAND research by the present authors analyzed prevailing personnel policies and concluded that, during the period from June 2001 through September 2003, the Army could have increased recruiter productivity at little or no cost by implementing modest changes in these practices.¹

    The present study focuses on measurement and assessment of recruiting performance. Performance metrics are important because they are the standard by which individuals and...

  9. CHAPTER TWO Models of Recruiter Effort, Market Quality, and Enlistment Supply
    (pp. 5-20)

    In this chapter, we present the econometric models we employed in our empirical work and recruiter performance measures based on those models. For given recruiting stations in particular months, the models relate enlistment outcomes (contracts signed) to recruiter effort and the quality of the recruiting market. We begin by reviewing a model used by Dertouzos and Garber (2006, Chapter Four) that focuses on a single enlistment outcome—namely, contracts signed by high-quality recruits.¹ This review provides background and context for a new model that distinguishes among the three contract types that are directly missioned, which we present subsequently.

    The key...

  10. CHAPTER THREE Data and Econometric Estimates of Contract-Production Models
    (pp. 21-56)

    In this chapter, we describe our data and then present estimates of the parameters of the model presented in Chapter Two that distinguish among the three types of separately missioned enlistments. We then present a model that distinguishes four categories of enlistments that are not missioned separately: (a) high-quality men, (b) high-quality women, (c) other men, and (d) other women—and present the estimates for that model. The latter model exemplifies how effort and market-quality levels might be distinguished for enlistment categories that are not separately missioned.

    To estimate the two models, we used data from more than 1,500 stations...

  11. CHAPTER FOUR Empirical Analysis of Performance Measures
    (pp. 57-64)

    In this chapter, we consider performance measurement empirically. We do so by focusing on station-level performance measurement for FY 2004 and the three categories of enlistment contracts that were missioned during our analysis period, namely, high-quality (AFQT IIIIA) graduates, high-quality seniors, and all others. More specifically, we compute and analyze five traditional measures of recruiting performance for FY 2004 and compare them with three versions of our conceptually preferred performance metric that was presented in equation (2.10). All eight of these measures are based on numbers of contracts signed, but they differ in other important respects.

    The five traditional measures...

  12. CHAPTER FIVE Choosing Performance Windows and Organizational Units for Evaluation
    (pp. 65-78)

    In this chapter, we evaluate alternative time intervals and organizational units for performance measurement. First, we discuss and assess appropriate performance windows for which performance metrics should be calculated. Second, we turn to the organizational unit and evaluate the efficacy of measuring performance for individual recruiters relative to station-level (team) performance measurement.

    In the short run, observed production by a station’s recruiters is a function of several factors, including the effort and skill of recruiters and the quality of the market in the station’s territory. In addition, outcomes depend on random factors that are not captured by any of the...

  13. CHAPTER SIX Conclusions
    (pp. 79-86)

    Performance metrics are the benchmarks by which individuals and management units of an organization are evaluated. If designed effectively, such measures can serve to motivate personnel and their managers and help ensure that individual incentives are well aligned with those of the organization. For Army recruiting, an ideal performance metric would isolate true productivity—a combination of effort exerted and skill applied—by making adjustments based on several factors. In particular, an effective performance metric for recruiters, stations, and other management units, should do the following:

    Adjust for exogenous factors, such as the quality of local markets or regions based...

  14. APPENDIX A Allocation of Recruiter Effort: Implications of a Microeconomic Model
    (pp. 87-94)
  15. APPENDIX B Recruiter Behavior in the Face of Risk
    (pp. 95-100)
  16. References
    (pp. 101-102)