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How Have Deployments During the War on Terrorism Affected Reenlistment?

How Have Deployments During the War on Terrorism Affected Reenlistment?

James Hosek
Francisco Martorell
Copyright Date: 2009
Edition: 1
Published by: RAND Corporation
Pages: 172
  • Book Info
    How Have Deployments During the War on Terrorism Affected Reenlistment?
    Book Description:

    This research sought to understand how recent deployments have affected reenlistment by examining trends in deployments and reenlistments, developing a theoretical model, and conducting an econometric analysis of survey and administrative data to identify the effect of deployment, by service, on reenlistment. It also examined the role of reenlistment bonuses in maintaining reenlistment levels during the war on terrorism.

    eISBN: 978-0-8330-4939-1
    Subjects: Political Science, Management & Organizational Behavior

Table of Contents

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  1. Front Matter
    (pp. i-ii)
  2. Preface
    (pp. iii-iv)
  3. Table of Contents
    (pp. v-vi)
  4. Figures
    (pp. vii-viii)
  5. Tables
    (pp. ix-xii)
  6. Summary
    (pp. xiii-xvi)
  7. Acknowledgments
    (pp. xvii-xviii)
  8. Abbreviations
    (pp. xix-xx)
  9. CHAPTER ONE Introduction
    (pp. 1-2)

    The military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have required the largest and longest use of U.S. military forces since the Vietnam conflict. The buildup of forces for these operations began in 2002, and, by 2007, more than 1.5 million service members had been deployed. Army deployments have been about 12—15 months in length, Marine Corps deployments about seven months, Navy deployments (typically on board ship) about six months, and Air Force deployments three months or longer. Deployments are generally periods of high stress, when daily activities vary from humdrum routine to fast-paced action and traumatizing events, especially for ground...

  10. CHAPTER TWO Background and Review of Selected Literature
    (pp. 3-18)

    The buildup of personnel for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) began in 2002 and peaked at 250,000 in spring 2003 as U.S. and coalition forces engaged and defeated Saddam Hussein’s armed forces. The United States quickly reduced its forces to around 124,000 after the victory, and the objectives became stabilization, reconstruction, and humanitarian assistance. The months following Saddam’s defeat did not secure the peace but, instead, saw the emergence of sectarianism as Shias gained political strength over the once-dominant Sunnis, the rise of insurgency as groups such as cleric Moktada al-Sadr’s militia sought to dislodge U.S. forces, the growing use of...

  11. CHAPTER THREE Modeling Deployment and Reenlistment
    (pp. 19-22)

    Reenlistment, an occupational choice decision, can be modeled as a comparison of the utility of staying in the current occupation with the utility of the best alternative. If the utility of serving in the military is higher than that of working in a civilian job, the individual will choose the military over the civilian job. This choice involves a comparison of expected utility based on information available at the time of the decision. Holding civilian utility constant, reenlistment is more likely to occur if the military utility is higher.

    In applying this idea, we assume that utility depends on the...

  12. CHAPTER FOUR Data Sources and Analysis Samples
    (pp. 23-28)

    We employ two datasets in our analyses. The first is a file generated from U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) administrative files and comprises all reenlistment decisions made by enlisted service members between 1996 and September 2007. This dataset contains information on deployment prior to the reenlistment decision, a measure of the reenlistment bonus for which the service member would be eligible, details about his or her status in the military (e. g., service, pay grade, years of service), and demographic characteristics. The large number of observations in the dataset makes it possible to conduct analyses focusing on subgroups of particular...

  13. CHAPTER FIVE Econometric Model
    (pp. 29-32)

    This chapter presents the econometric model used in this study. It also discusses the nature of possible biases in estimates of deployment and bonus effects and our approach to mitigating them. This discussion focuses on empirical reenlistment models, but the same issues apply to the outcomes available in the survey data.

    The basic model relates reenlistment of member$i,{R_i},$

    to deployment,${D_i}$

    (which may be a vector of deployment variables); the SRB multiplier,${B_i};$

    and a vector of covariates,${X_i}:$

    ${R_i} = \theta {D_i}{\rm{ + }}\beta {B_i}{\rm{ + }}\gamma {X_i}{\rm{ + }}{\varepsilon _i}$

    Unobservable factors that determine reenlistment are captured by the residual${\varepsilon _i}$. a a a a a a a...

  14. CHAPTER SIX Empirical Results Using Survey Data
    (pp. 33-38)

    This chapter presents findings based on the survey data. We examine measures of subjective satisfaction and quality of life, as measured by higher-than-usual work or personal stress, and intentions to reenlist. Then, we analyze actual reenlistment behavior among the subsample of survey respondents for whom we observe reenlistment decisions.

    Baseline Estimates Tables 6.1 and 6.2 show the “baseline” estimates of the deployment effects for first-and second-term-plus respondents, respectively. The estimated coefficient is on an indicator for having hostile deployment in the year prior to the survey.¹² As discussed in Chapter Three, the Status of Forces active-duty surveys used in the...

  15. CHAPTER SEVEN Empirical Results Using Administrative Data
    (pp. 39-58)

    This chapter presents our estimates of reenlistment models using administrative data from personnel and pay files. We first present overall results for the period from 2002 to 2007, broken out by term and service. Since the nature and intensity of hostile deployments change over this period, we then examine how the hostile deployment effects vary over time. The findings indicate that, in the Army, there was a sharp fall in the effect of hostile deployment on first-and second-term reenlistment, with the effect becoming negative in 2006. In the other services there was little deployment effect on first-term reenlistment; the effect...

  16. CHAPTER EIGHT The Role of Reenlistment Bonuses in Sustaining Retention
    (pp. 59-68)

    The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the role of bonuses in helping to sustain retention despite the downward effect of hostile deployment on Army first-and second-term reenlistment and on Marine Corps second-term reenlistment. This chapter builds on the model presented in Chapter Three. The model implies that, for any given level of deployment, it is possible to compute the bonus needed to restore the ex ante level of utility. For instance, suppose a soldier is thinking of reenlisting and initially expects for certain one hostile deployment of 12 months in a four-year term. Although the amount of time...

  17. CHAPTER NINE Conclusion
    (pp. 69-72)

    The burden placed on military personnel by OEF and OIF is undeniable. Before 9/11, the number of active-duty personnel receiving HFP was less than 50,000 per month. When U.S. forces fought Saddam’s army in spring 2003, the number stood at 300,000 or nearly three in 10 of the 1.1 million-person active-duty force. In the years since then, 150,000 to 200,000 service members, mostly soldiers and marines, have received HFP each month. Since 2004, 80 percent of soldiers at reenlistment had been deployed at least once in the preceding three years, up from 30 percent in 1996– 2002, and average months...

  18. APPENDIX A A Model of Reenlistment Bonus Setting
    (pp. 73-82)
  19. APPENDIX B Relationship Between Bias in Estimated Bonus Effect and Estimated Deployment Effect
    (pp. 83-84)
  20. APPENDIX C Additional Regression Results
    (pp. 85-144)
  21. APPENDIX D Comparison with Hansen and Wenger’s Navy Pay Elasticity
    (pp. 145-148)
  22. References
    (pp. 149-152)