Mutual funds form the bedrock of retirement savings in the
United States, and, considering their rapid growth, are sure to be
more critical in the future. Because the size of fees paid by
investors to mutual fund advisers can strongly affect the return on
investment, these fees have become a contentious issue in Congress
and the courts, with many arguing that investment advisers grow
rich at the expense of investors.
This ground-breaking book not only conceptualizes a new economic
model of the mutual fund industry, but also uses this model to test
for price competition between investment advisers, evaluating the
assertion that market forces fail to protect investors' returns
from excessive fees. Highly experienced authors track the growth of
the industry over the past twenty-five years and present arguments
and evidence both for and against theories of adviser malfeasance.
The authors review the regulatory history of mutual fund fees and
summarize leading case decisions addressing excessive fees.
Revealing the extent to which the governance structure of mutual
funds truly impacts fund performance, this book provides the best
understanding of today's mutual fund industry and is a vital tool
for investors, money managers, fund directors, securities lawyers,
economists, and anyone concerned with the regulation of mutual
Subjects: Law, Business, Finance
Table of Contents
You are viewing the table of contents
You do not have access to this
on JSTOR. Try logging in through your institution for access.