Ethnic conflicts have created crises within NATO and between
NATO and Russia, produced massive flows of refugees, destabilized
neighboring countries, and increased the risk of nuclear war
between Pakistan and India. Interventions have cost the United
States, the United Nations, and other actors billions of
While scholars and policymakers have devoted considerable
attention to this issue, the question of why states take sides in
other countries' ethnic conflicts has largely been ignored. Most
attention has been directed at debating the value of particular
techniques to manage ethnic conflict, including partition,
prevention, mediation, intervention, and the like. However, as the
Kosovo dispute demonstrated, one of the biggest obstacles to
resolving ethnic conflicts is getting the outside actors to
cooperate. This book addresses this question.
Saideman argues that domestic political competition compels
countries to support the side of an ethnic conflict with which
constituents share ethnicities. He applies this argument to the
Congo Crisis, the Nigerian Civil War, and Yugoslavia's civil wars.
He then applies quantitative analyses to ethnic conflicts in the
1990s. Finally, he discusses recent events in Kosovo and whether
the findings of these case studies apply more broadly.
Subjects: Political Science, History
You do not have access to this book on JSTOR. Try logging in through your institution for access.
Log in to your personal account or through your institution.
Table of Contents
Export Selected Citations
Export to NoodleTools
Export to RefWorks
Export to EasyBib
Export a RIS file
(For EndNote, ProCite, Reference Manager, Zotero, Mendeley...)
Export a Text file