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Hitler And Spain

Hitler And Spain: The Nazi Role in the Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939

Copyright Date: 1989
Edition: 1
Pages: 280
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  • Book Info
    Hitler And Spain
    Book Description:

    The Spanish Civil War, begun in July 1936, was a preliminary round of World War II. Hitler's and Mussolini's cooperation with General Franco resulted in the Axis agreement of October 1936 and the subsequent Pact of Steel of May 1939, immediately following the end of the Civil War.

    This study presents comprehensive documentation of Hitler's use of the upheaval in Spain to strengthen the Third Reich diplomatically, ideologically, economically, and militarily. While the last great cause drew all eyes to Western Europe and divided the British and especially the French internally, Hitler could pursue territorial gains in Eastern Europe.

    This book, based on little-known German records and recently opened Spanish archives, fills a major gap in our understanding of one of the 20th century's most significant conflicts. Its comprehensive treatment of German-Spanish relations from 1936 through 1939, bringing together diplomatic, economic, military, and naval aspects, will be of great value to specialists in European diplomacy and the political economy of Nazi imperialism, as well as to all students of the Spanish Civil War.

    eISBN: 978-0-8131-4863-2
    Subjects: History, Political Science

Table of Contents

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  1. Front Matter
    (pp. i-iv)
  2. Table of Contents
    (pp. v-v)
  3. List of Tables, Figures, and Maps
    (pp. vi-vi)
  4. Preface
    (pp. vii-ix)
  5. [Map]
    (pp. x-x)
  6. 1 Hitler’s Diplomatic Policy toward Spain: July 1936
    (pp. 1-25)

    The outbreak of the Spanish Civil War marked a major turning point in the European balance of power. Adolf Hitler, the Führer of Germany, and Benito Mussolini, the Duce of Italy, aided the Spanish military rebellion in a cooperation that paved the way for their political understanding in October 1936—the Axis. On the other side of the barricades, the Soviet Union supported the Spanish Republicans, and substantial unofficial aid flowed from France to the Loyalists, though the French and British governments officially avoided confronting the Fascist and Nazi dictatorships.

    The principal purpose of this volume is to document how...

  7. 2 The Ideology of Anticommunism: July 1936–March 1939
    (pp. 26-43)

    Political propagandists of all persuasions utilize religion and ideology by manipulating words and images that incite people to kill. Favorite techniques appeal to patriotism and seek to dehumanize the enemy. In the twentieth century people have fought over such abstractions as Christianity, Islam, Huns, communists, fascists, aggressors, “the nation,” and “the enemy.” Anticommunism, like the anti-Christ from the Book of Revelation, arises from a Manichean concept of a dualistic world where people suppose that good and evil can be clearly and readily differentiated. Nationalism and anticommunism were two concepts that united Franco and Hitler.

    Adolf Hitler exploited the slogan “anticommunism”...

  8. 3 The Diplomacy of the Anti-Comintern Bloc
    (pp. 44-71)

    The 1936 Spanish generals’ coup attempt stimulated further cooperation between Italy and Germany on several fronts. During the first week of August 1936, propaganda ministers Goebbels and Alfieri worked out a joint German-Italian stand against the “bolshevik danger” in Spain. At the same time Admiral Canaris, the German military intelligence chief, met at Bolzano with his Italian counterpart, Roatta, to discuss secret military aspects of the Spanish question.¹ Colonel Roatta confirmed that Mussolini had sent nine planes, and that a shipload of ammunition and military personnel was on the way. They also discussed Italian and German cooperation on the issue...

  9. 4 The Development of German Economic Interests
    (pp. 72-94)

    In July 1936, at the start of German aid to Franco, Hitler expressly ordered Goring to secure economic rewards. Thus, economic, rather than political or ideological, means were used to create institutions in Spain that could, in the long run, help Germany. The Germans immediately established a civilian economic agency in Spain to serve as a cover-up for the German military intervention and to begin arranging for payments by the rebels. These tasks were undertaken by Johannes Bernhardt, one of the two German businessmen in Morocco who had carried Franco’s original appeal to Hitler.

    Bernhardt owed his sudden rise to...

  10. 5 The Place of Spain in German War Plans
    (pp. 95-134)

    Responsibility for Hitler’s actions in the Spanish Civil War has sometimes been laid upon Admiral Wilhelm Canaris, Hitler’s chief of military intelligence.¹ Through his twenty-year history of activity in Spain, Canaris was the officer in the German War Ministry with the best contacts in that country when the civil war began.

    Canaris remains one of the controversial figures of recent German history, not only because of his “cloak and dagger” operations, but because of his eventual opposition to Hitler. Jailed shortly after the failure of an attempt to assassinate Hitler in July 1944, the admiral was executed by the Nazis...

  11. 6 Conclusions
    (pp. 135-142)

    This book has examined three basic questions. First, what role did Adolf Hitler play in bringing Francisco Franco to power in Spain? Second and third, during the years of the Spanish upheaval, what gains did the Führer make in the European balance of power generally and in Franco’s Spain specifically? In the decisive years of 1936-1939, Hitler made his Spanish decisions in four interrelated areas: political, military, ideological, and economic. This book has traced the paths of development in those areas.

    The failed coup d’etat of July 1936 turned into a long campaign to reconquer Spain, the consequences of which...

  12. Appendix A. Note on Monetary Values
    (pp. 143-143)
  13. Appendix B. German Intelligence Agents in Spain before July 1936
    (pp. 144-149)
  14. Appendix C. Chronology
    (pp. 150-162)
  15. Notes
    (pp. 163-219)
  16. Bibliographical Note
    (pp. 220-231)
  17. Bibliography of Published Books, Dissertations, and Articles
    (pp. 232-244)
  18. Index
    (pp. 245-269)