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TRIPLEX: Secrets from the Cambridge Spies

Nigel West
Oleg Tsarev
Copyright Date: 2009
Published by: Yale University Press
Pages: 384
  • Cite this Item
  • Book Info
    Book Description:

    TRIPLEXreveals more clearly than ever before the precise nature and extent of the damage done to the much-vaunted British intelligence establishment during World War II by the notorious "Cambridge Five" spy ring-Kim Philby, Donald Maclean, Guy Burgess, Anthony Blunt, and John Cairncross. The code word TRIPLEX refers to an exceptionally sensitive intelligence source, one of the most closely guarded secrets of the war, which appears nowhere in any of the British government's official histories. TRIPLEX was material extracted illicitly from the diplomatic pouches of neutral missions in wartime London. MI5, the British Security Service, entrusted the job of overseeing the highly secret assignment to Anthony Blunt, who was already working for the NKVD, Stalin's intelligence service. The rest is history, documented here for the first time in rich detail.

    eISBN: 978-0-300-15641-6
    Subjects: History

Table of Contents

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  1. Front Matter
    (pp. i-iv)
  2. Table of Contents
    (pp. v-vi)
  3. Acknowledgments
    (pp. vii-vii)
  4. Note on the Translation
    (pp. vii-viii)
  5. List of Abbreviations
    (pp. ix-xii)
  6. Introduction
    (pp. 1-4)

    Triplex was, and remains, one of the most closely guarded secrets of the Second World War. No reference to it has ever been published, and the official multi-volume historyBritish Intelligence in the Second World Warcontains absolutely no mention of this source, which is still highly classified in Britain. Ironically, the only documents to describe the source are to be found in Moscow, where they were sent by Anthony Blunt, one of the very few Security Service (MI5) officers entrusted with the task of supervising the XXX (triplex) operation and distributing the intelligence product: material extracted illegally from the...

  7. PART I. Anthony Blunt’s MI5 Documents

    • 1 The Swedish Naval Attaché
      (pp. 5-8)

      [Blunt’s first document is an MI5 report on the Swedish naval attaché Count Johan G. Oxenstierna, who was quietly removed from his post at the request of the British government at the end of 1943 and replaced by the king’s grandson, Prince Bertil. Oxenstierna was suitably indignant about his treatment and the British ambassador in Stockholm, Victor Mallet, pressed his case, as did the British naval attaché, Henry Denham, but the Foreign Office was adamant about his removal and equally insistent that the precise nature of his offence should not be disclosed. Oxenstierna had been responsible for the leakage of...

    • 2 Japanese Suspects, October 1941
      (pp. 9-11)

      [MI5’s Japanese Section contained a file note on Japanese intelligence in the United Kingdom and persons investigated on suspicion of working for Japanese intelligence, among them the 19th Baron Sempill, a veteran of the Royal Naval Air Service who had been employed after the First World War to organise the Japanese Naval Air Service. Further details of the Sempill affair may be found in Richard Aldrich’sIntelligence and the War Against Japan(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).]

      The Japanese have an extensive intelligence network throughout the British Empire. It is run mainly through their embassies and consulates, which act as...

    • 3 Neutral Attachés in London, September 1943
      (pp. 11-13)


      No. 3 Source T. Bag

      No. 19 of 12 September 1943

      Film no. 1

      In August 1941 the Security Service presented a memorandum to the JIC [Joint Intelligence Committee] recommending that the activities of the attachés of neutral countries in the UK be circumscribed (see JlC/4&1, 24th Session of 8 August 1941). The matter was re-examined at the prime minister’s request in July 1943 (see JIC 1045/43 of 16 July 1943).

      It was recognized that the security measures taken on the basis of the JIC paper of 1941 had been effective in that the risk represented by the...

    • 4 Diplomatic Missions in London
      (pp. 14-25)

      The rearmament of England is now complete; that of the USA is proceeding at top speed.

      During the next few months strong land and air forces will be directed towards the final defeat of the Axis countries. Our only problem is providing enough ships to do the job. Control of the Mediterranean enables us to use the much larger vessels that were previously forced to take the long route around Africa.

      Italy can be forced to leave the war by an intensive bombing campaign. In any case, the Alpine barrier makes Italy a cul-de-sac that we cannot use for our...

    • 5 MI5’s History
      (pp. 26-103)

      [A history of the Security Service was supplied to Guy Liddell, then director of B Division, MI5’s counter-espionage branch, who was known administratively simply by the initials ‘DB’. Accordingly, his personal assistant, Anthony Blunt, was ‘PADB’. The document was written by Jack Curry, and he refers in passing to two members of F Division, (Sir) Roger Hollis and Graham Mitchell. Both remained in the Security Service after the war and were appointed director-general and deputy director-general, respectively. This document was the first draft of a longer document that was declassified and released to the Public Record Office at Kew and...

  8. PART II. Kim Philby’s SIS Documents

    • 6 Colonel Vivian’s Briefing, 1943
      (pp. 104-107)

      Translated from the English on 1 December 1943, a report from SÖNCHEN dated 10 May 1943, describing a briefing given to SIS’s Section V on 6 March 1943 by Colonel Valentine Vivian on the subject of Communist penetration of British secret organisations, about which he [Vivian] had spoken to him privately the previous Saturday: ‘He added little of significance to what he had already told me, but the following details may be of some interest.’

      He began with a brief review of Communist revolutionary movements and warned again the general tendency in the UK to whitewash the USSR. As he...

    • 7 ISOS, March 1943
      (pp. 108-111)

      According to intelligence from agents and documentary material, the British military radio intelligence service is intercepting the following German traffic:

      1. Operational orders of the German High Command (a) from the HQ of the Luftwaffe Group in the Caucasus; (b) from the operations section of the IV staff of the Luftwaffe to the commander of the Caucasus Group of the Luftwaffe and Luftwaffe HQ in the Crimea; (c) from the Luftwaffe mission in Romania to Goering’s field HQ; (d) from the Luftwaffe HQ in Italy to the Luftwaffe Fleet Air Arm Commander in Varna; (e) orders from Goering’s field HQ; (f)...

    • 8 Breaking Soviet Ciphers
      (pp. 111-111)

      Intelligence from stanley on the steps being taken by the GC & CS to break Soviet ciphers. stanley does not know the details but is aware that:

      1. GC & CS is currently preparing measures to break all Soviet ciphers—diplomatic, military, naval, etc.

      2. GC & CS assumes that Soviet ciphers are machine generated.

      3. So far the British have not been able to break any Soviet five-letter ciphers.

      4. s[tanley] cannot answer the other questions since he is not in the picture.

      [5.] GC & CS has already put together a large group of specialists and technical personnel to work on Soviet ciphers.

      [6.] At the...

    • 9 SIS Sources for Strategic Appreciations
      (pp. 111-112)

      a. Operational materials. This is the only good source. Intelligence is extracted from it on German orders for operations and troop movements.

      b. Abwehr traffic—the best source of operational intelligence information.

      c. Diplomatic cables—useful for clarifying rumours but of no military significance.

      d. Police traffic—useful for appraisal of SS orders relating to their military operations and sometimes casting an indirect light on German army operations.

      Commercial cables provide no intelligence whatsoever. Postal censorship provides valuable input on German civilian morale but very rarely sheds any light on the military situation.

      Practically none of the agents in the...

    • 10 C’s Directive, September 1944
      (pp. 113-114)

      Further to my recent briefing on co-ordinating the work of Section IX and the resources of Section V this directive will have effect from the dates indicated in Para. 7.

      1. The direction and management of Sections V and IX will remain, as at present, under the immediate control of DD/SP [SIS director of security]. Lieutenant Colonel Cowgill will be responsible to DD/SP for the work of Section V. After the final handover from the head of Section IX, Mr Philby will be responsible to DD/SP for its work.

      2. In carrying out their functions, Sections V and IX will, as now,...

    • 11 Report from Philby, December 1944
      (pp. 114-115)

      Cowgill, Vivian, Curry, Milne, Steptoe, O’Brian and Philby attended a meeting on 18 August in the counter-intelligence department of SIS to discuss the development of anti-Communist work in the time ahead and the co-operation of Section V in this area.

      The general view was that at the present time the main job of Section V was the destruction of the German military and political intelligence services and that it was therefore unable to divert much in the way of resources for anti-Communist work. It was, however, recognized that given the growing interest of the Foreign Office in investigating the Communist...

    • 12 Philby’s Memo to C, November 1944
      (pp. 115-116)

      The attached excellent, albeit somewhat lengthy memorandum by Curry—which exemplifies his best features, perception and diligence—has brought me ‘to a crossroads’ as regards SIS attitude to the problem.

      When I requested your agreement to the creation of Section IX, I envisaged its work in extremely broad terms. I assumed that its functions should include the making of critical analyses, and the collating of the incidental intelligence we have received over the past five or six years, and the professional handling of any cases coming to our notice involving Communists or people concerned in Soviet espionage; I also concluded...

    • 13 Section IX Personnel
      (pp. 116-118)

      Letter no. 4 of 16 July 1945

      Herewith CVs from stanley on the officers of SIS’s Section IX:

      1. Assistant head of section Lieutenant Colonel Rodney O. Dennys. Dennys joined SIS in 1938. He was Section V’s head of station in The Hague and worked in Section V after the evacuation from Holland. At the end of 1941 he was posted as Section V’s head of station to Cairo, where he ran counter-intelligence across the entire Middle East. He has SIS’s symbol 89700. He was recalled to London at the beginning of 1944 and began to prepare for the post of...

    • 14 Commander Dunderdale’s SLC, July 1945
      (pp. 118-120)

      S3 Letter no. 4 of 16 July 1945

      There follows information from stanley on Dunderdale’s organisation.

      Dunderdale is SIS’s Controller, Special Liaison (SLC).

      His section has two sub-sections—Atlantic and non-Atlantic—the former dealing with certain types of intelligence relating to the USSR. The latter handles liaison with, for instance, Donovan’s organisation [US Office of Strategic Services], Polish intelligence, certain sections of French intelligence, etc. As far as stanley can establish, there is no organisational connection between the two sections. It would be very easy to separate them and put each under its own head.

      The Atlantic section gets intelligence...

    • 15 Memo on Penetrating Russia
      (pp. 120-129)

      SIS may be tasked for this soon after the cessation of hostilities in Germany.

      This paper attempts to anticipate and resolve certain problems.

      The original of this memorandum from SPS [Rodney Dennys, secretary of the SIS Planning Department] was first passed to XS/F [Lord Farrar] and then to V1/C [Robert Smith] for comment. To make it easier to read, their comments are noted against each paragraph.

      If we want to achieve any sort of success, our plan must be designed for the long term.

      The contemporary young Russian official, brought up in and, in many instances, born into the Party...

    • 16 Colonel Vivian’s Reply to the Memo
      (pp. 129-131)

      I have read the attached paper carefully. I will try to resist the temptation to comment on it in detail and will confine myself to an examination of the plan as a whole.

      As such I completely disagree with it.

      In my opinion it flies in the face of the fundamental policy of the Foreign Office and SIS.

      A few commonsense constraints aside, the Foreign Office has allowed me considerable latitude in relation to XK [anti-Communist] work and Soviet official links with us, but only insofar as we steer completely clear of doing anything whatever in the USSR itself.


    • 17 SIS Symbols, 23 July 1947
      (pp. 131-132)
    • 18 SIS Internal Country Codes Used Up to the Second Half of 1946
      (pp. 132-133)
    • 19 Report on SIS Reorganisation, July 1945
      (pp. 134-138)

      A committee set up by the chief of SIS on the reorganisation of the British intelligence system began work in June this year. By 6 July it had already met eight times.

      Although its remit was to look into the whole reorganisation issue in great detail (down to appointing officers even to the more junior positions), the committee has so far concentrated only on the general basis of the future organisation of British intelligence. A preliminary report on this has already been submitted to CSS.

      The committee comprises: Chairman—Menzies, CSS. Deputy chairman—Maurice Jeffes. Permanent members: Colonel Cordeaux, Dick...

    • 20 Colonel Vivian’s Memo, September 1944
      (pp. 138-141)

      Sections I, IX, V, VK

      22850, CMed., CNA, CWE, CFE

      1. This memorandum provides a general picture of the XK [anti-Communist] situation in SIS both at home and abroad and sets out the reasons that have prompted me to seek your advice on the best methods of organising our work in this area overseas.

      The problem is extremely broad and complex. It therefore seems to me to be both impractical and undesirable to discuss it in a formal meeting. It can, nonetheless, be readily divided into convenient component parts, which can be sufficiently clearly defined and which are independent enough of...

    • 21 The XK Problem in SIS, 6 September 1944
      (pp. 141-145)

      Section IX was set up in May 1943 as an independent mobile section under supervision of DD/SP with the general aim of handling ‘intelligence relating to clandestine, subversive or espionage activity of the Comintern or any other organisations linked with it or with the government of the USSR’. In more detailed directives approved by CSS the responsibilities of the head of section are defined as follows:

      a. To study and collate all intelligence on this issue received by SIS from the time Communism became a target of primary interest in a global context and in particular [intelligence on] individual countries....

    • 22 Report on the Mediterranean Inspection, August 1944
      (pp. 145-157)

      1. Aim—The purpose of the trip was, in essence, to provide basic training in XK issues, to assess the situation on the XK front in all the stations visited, to study the opportunities for development of XK work and to present a comprehensive report on these matters for Head Office review upon my return.

      2. Line to take—This can be summarized as follows:

      a. In training on XK matters special attention must be paid to the extreme delicacy of the task of penetrating the XK, bearing in mind the risk of diplomatic complications.

      b. Officers’ attention must be drawn to...

    • 23 Report on the Western Mediterranean Inspection, August 1944
      (pp. 158-165)

      It remains to review the position of XK work in the western Mediterranean stations.

      Algiers—The transfer of AFHQ [Allied Forces Headquarters] to Italy, and with it Station 92000 and its XB organisation, will inevitably mean the end of XB work in North Africa unless 27400’s organisation, which I gather is to remain in Algiers, can carry the extra load.

      This would be a pity, since despite the small amount of XK intelligence received in Algiers, things were under way and might have developed further, especially as regards source ‘Matters’ from the Austrian Liberation Movement, together with the possible use...

    • 24 The Structure of SIS
      (pp. 165-169)

      Cohen is DP.

      Controllers WR [Western Region]: Commander Patrick Whinney NR [Northern Region]: Harry Carr Eastern Mediterranean: Colonel John Teague Commander William H. Bremner Americas: Rex Miller Special: Ellis

      Miller spent the entire war as head of station in Buenos Aires.

      Head of Intelligence Department, John Morley; assistant, Annabel Leach.

      P2 Europe (Italy, Spain, Portugal, North Africa, Switzerland). Head, Desmond Bristow.

      P3, headed by Peter Bide; assistant, Phillip Wyatt.

      P6 and 7: heads, Christopher Phillpotts and Wood (Scandinavia, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Finland and the Moscow station).

      P8, headed by Malcolm Munthe.

      P5 deals with the Balkans; Leonard Harris; assistant, Wilhemind Payne...

    • 25 The Reorganisation of SIS
      (pp. 169-170)

      The directorate of SIS has decided to implement a fundamental reorganisation. It will be put into effect in the near future. The basic organisational structure of SIS will be as follows:

      The position of head of the Intelligence Directorate will be abolished and his functions transferred to VCSS [vice chief of SIS]. The latter will be responsible to CSS for SIS’s intelligence and sabotage operations. ‘Intelligence’ means the procurement of intelligence information. ‘Sabotage’ refers to those elements of SOE’s operations that will be allowed to continue.

      Reporting to VCSS will be three chief controllers [CCs]:

      1. Europe—Commander Kenneth Cohen

      2. Mediterranean—...

    • 26 Telegrams from SIS’s Moscow Station, July 1942
      (pp. 170-173)

      [In July 1942, Colonel Fedotov, then the head of the NKVD’s Second Directorate, responsible for internal security, was supplied by Major Fitin of the First Directorate with copies of SIS telegrams sent to London, where they were copied by Philby, together with two cables from London addressed to George Berry, the head of station in Moscow. Quite apart from compromising individual sources, the content may have been of great assistance to Soviet cryptographers anxious to crack SIS codes.]

      1. CXg 458 of 26 May 1942

      ‘Re Parker, I suggest a basic salary of £400 per annum, free of tax, plus £200...

    • 27 SIS Plans for Anti-Soviet Operations, June 1944
      (pp. 173-175)

      [This internal memorandum, dated 6 June 1944, sets out SIS’s plans for running future operations against the Soviets. Dated June 1944, it supports the hitherto controversial view that long before the war had been won in western Europe, SIS was contemplating anti-Soviet activities, a matter that has been debated by historians, among them Robert Cecil, himself a former SIS staff officer and assistant to the chief, who always denied that such mischievous issues had been raised so early.]

      1. Our main operators against XK must be contacted:

      a. in absolute secrecy as far as XK is concerned; and

      b. in such...

    • 28 Blueprint for SIS’s Post-War Organisation
      (pp. 175-182)

      [This plan was compiled by Patrick Denney, permanent secretary of SIS’s Intelligence Planning Bureau.]

      The two main tasks of SIS after the war will be:

      1. Deep penetration into the political, economic and military activity of all countries whose intentions represent or may represent a threat to the security of HMG.

      2. The protection and maintenance of the security of SIS, such activity inside HMG by joint operations with the Security Service and the penetration of foreign secret organisations and subversive movements that might represent a danger to SIS.

      This paper is intended mainly as a review of point 1. The tasks...

    • 29 Symbols of SIS’s Senior Personnel
      (pp. 182-183)
    • 30 SIS’s Internal Structure, March 1946
      (pp. 183-188)

      Information from stanley by Letter no. 1 of 8 March 1946.

      The reorganisation of SIS is now advanced sufficiently to enable some light to be shed on its structure. The changes that have been made may not be final. Much will depend on SIS’s budget, of which more will be known in April. It is presumed that it will be significantly cut back.

      Brigadier Menzies remains the director (CSS). There are rumours that he will be replaced but so far no confirmation.

      Major General Sinclair has been appointed deputy director (VCSS); he was formerly DMI [director of military intelligence] at...

  9. PART III. John Cairncross’s Documents

    • [PART III Introduction]
      (pp. 189-190)

      John Cairncross was one of the most intelligent men of his generation; his cerebral prowess was demonstrated when he gained the top marks in both the Home and Foreign Office Civil Service examinations in 1936, a unique accomplishment. He was also a Marxist and supplied secrets to his Soviet contact from almost the moment he entered the Foreign Office. Always a difficult colleague, socially insecure and notoriously awkward to deal with, he moved to the Cabinet Office to serve as Lord Hankey’s private secretary and later in the war was called up for the army, only to be posted to...

    • 31 Lord Hankey’s Inquiry into SIS and MI5, 1940
      (pp. 190-233)

      Copy to Mr Gladwyn Jebb

      11 March 1940


      I have today sent to the prime minister my first report on the Secret Service with copies to the foreign secretary and the Service ministers.

      I am also sending a copy to Gladwyn Jebb for the files. I look to him to ensure that in due course all those concerned will be advised of its conclusions.

      I hope that you will find it possible to put into effect my recommendation for monthly meetings under your chairmanship. I attach some importance to these meetings as an integral element of the Secret...

    • 32 Message from EDWARD, 29 November 1944
      (pp. 233-233)


      A circular signed by Menzies about two weeks ago instructed SIS representatives to make attempts to penetrate Soviet organisations but said that all proposals to this end needed to be agreed on in advance with the directorate.

      In a previous circular Menzies stated that in implementing his directive, work against Communism was to be undertaken in close co-operation with Section V. The latter’s work will be under the direction of Philby (who will have the symbol VN), who will report to Vivian (DD/SP).

      He will begin work on 12 October and take over completely from Curry by 15...

    • 33 Philby’s Letter to Peter Loxley, September 1944, with the Curry Memorandum on Soviet Espionage
      (pp. 233-248)


      DCSS 65/1 of 13 September 1944

      My Dear Loxley,

      I am not sure whether you are aware that six months ago C [chief of SIS] approved the establishment under my immediate supervision of a small section (Section IX—consisting at present of one officer and a secretary) to make a special study of the illegal activity of the Communist movement in other countries and to investigate cases of Communist or Soviet penetration and espionage.

      The underlying thinking can be summarized as follows.

      Before the war these functions had been one of my responsibilities as head of Section V....

    • 34 Peter Loxley’s Letter to Colonel Vivian, November 1944
      (pp. 248-249)


      Foreign Office

      20 October 1943

      My Dear Vivian,

      Thank you for your letter DCCS 65/1 of 13 October regarding the illegal activity of the Communist movement overseas.

      We have no objection to, and indeed see significant benefit in, the organisation you propose on the condition that matters are handled with the necessary care and that you do nothing directly in the USSR (notwithstanding Soviet espionage in our own country). Our view is that we certainly have to know what the Soviet government is doing through auxiliary organisations such as the Communist Parties abroad and what special...

  10. PART IV. NKVD Reports

    • [PART IV Introduction]
      (pp. 250-251)

      Among the many remarkable items declassified and released in Moscow was a batch of files prepared by senior members of the NKVD’s Third Department, which was the section responsible for First Chief Directorate operations in England, directly supervising the activities of therezidentin London. The evidence suggests that high-grade information came on stream in the later part of 1940, when Anatoli V. Gorsky returned to the Soviet Embassy under diplomatic cover to rebuild the organisation he had been ordered to abandon in February by Lavrenti Beria on the entirely mistaken grounds that the local network had been compromised by...

    • 35 Confession of the SIS Agent Aleksandr S. Nelidov
      (pp. 251-273)

      In November 1917, I joined General Alekseev’s volunteer army in Rostov on the Don, in Kornilov’s [illegible]. After the so-called Kornilov campaign, i.e. the retreat to Ekaterinodar, I was attached to army headquarters as an officer for assignments with the Operations Section.

      After the elimination of Denikin’s army, I was detailed for duty with the commander of the Georgian units, General Artemiladze, to organise signals and supplies for General Fostikov’s detachments, which were withdrawing to the Batalpashinskii area. After the defeat of Wrangel’s army in the Crimea, I worked at the headquarters of the Georgian Popular Guard, as aide-de-camp in...

    • 36 British Deception Schemes, May 1944
      (pp. 273-298)

      This report does not purport to give an exhaustive account of British deception in historical perspective or to show a full picture of the present situation. It aims to give a brief description of the structure of the British deception agencies and their work based on the current war-based material obtained by the First Directorate of the NKVD.

      Accordingly, the report is divided into three sections:

      1. Organisational structure, staff and functions of the British deception agencies

      2. Deception during the preparations for the Allies’ invasion of Sicily

      3. Deception during the preparations for the opening of a Second Front

      The report is...

    • 37 MI5 Surveillance of Foreign Diplomatic Missions
      (pp. 298-315)

      Surveillance of the activities of foreign missions in the UK and also the investigation of foreigners and Communists is the task of what is called the Security Service. The divisions of the Security Service that deal directly with these matters have the following specific tasks:

      1. To investigate and interdict espionage and other anti-state activity on the part of foreign intelligence services

      2. Production of intelligence

      3. Deception of foreign intelligence services

      4. Recruitment of special agents for future use in intelligence work overseas

      There are three divisions in the Service that carry out these tasks. The socalled B Division, which handles espionage; E...

    • 38 MI5’s Targeting of Foreign Diplomatic Missions in London
      (pp. 315-316)


      MI5 targets foreign missions accredited to the British government in London. We have information that they have targeted the Swedish, Swiss, Spanish, Turkish, Portuguese, Egyptian, Brazilian, Chilean and Peruvian missions.

      Since the start of hostilities with Germany, MI5’s main objective has been to determine what espionage activity was being carried out via the missions for the benefit of their home countries and, above all, Germany.

      MI5 focussed most heavily on the Spanish and Swedish missions and has a considerable network among the staff of the Spanish mission. The following are known to be British agents:

      Barra, the military...

    • 39 Elena Modrzhinskaya’s Report, April 1943
      (pp. 317-334)

      Shortly before the German attack on the Soviet Union, ‘intelligence services’ [IS] circles began to turn their minds to a possible Anglo-Soviet war. In that connection a special IS bureau was set up to study the situation in the Caucasus, the Ukraine and Bessararabia. The Russian Bureau staff includes such British intelligence experts on Russia as Clively (who presently heads the Russian Section of the British Ministry of Economic Warfare’s intelligence organisation), David Roberts (who, according to information at our disposal, has worked in British intelligence against the USSR since 1926 and who is now air attaché in the [British...

    • 40 Dossier on Harold Gibson, September 1949
      (pp. 335-344)

      Gibson, Harold Charles Lers, was born in 1897 in London, a British citizen.

      Statements by a British intelligence agent Vasiliev in 1945, however, indicate that Gibson was born in 1894, in Moscow.

      Speaks many foreign languages fluently, including Russian. Educated in England. Hates the USSR and the People’s Democracies. Something of a loner.

      Source pavlov stated in 1944 that as a child, Gibson lived in Russia with his parents. He served in the Russian army in the First World War as a soldier and a junior officer. Gibson’s father is dead. His mother lives in London. During the Second World...

  11. Index
    (pp. 345-363)