Stein’s position on individuality is of interest because she attempts to offer a substantive and nuanced account of individuality that compromises neither the unique irreproducibility of each person nor a common human form. She follows the Platonic and Aristotelian tradition in claiming a common human nature based in a distinctly human form, and yet she also insists that that which makes us unique is not an afterthought or anything secondary to that which makes us alike. She values both the uniqueness of each individual person and the species-form which makes all of us part of one group.

In order to...

Edith Stein titles the final chapter of her great philosophical opus “The Meaning and Foundation of Being Individual.” She opens that chapter by saying:

In the treatment of the being of the human person, another question is often encountered that we have touched upon in other contexts and that now must be clarified if the nature of human beings, their place in the order of the created world, and their relation to divine being is to be understood: the question of the being individual (of the individuality) of human beings, which can be treated only in the context of a...

Stein posits an individual form, which is distinct from the species-form, for each human being, and she understands this individual form as having some significant role in making individual (finite) persons¹ unique (although not in the stronger sense of unrepeatably unique). Stein does not claim that non-human corporeal entities each have an individual form.² She leaves this an open question, but she makes clear her commitment to individual forms for each human being (and each angelic being)—that is, finite personal beings each have a unique individual form.³

Full appreciation of Stein’s account of individual forms and their role in...

Stein posits individual form as a metaphysically real principle distinct in content for each finite personal being. In the following three chapters I would like to look more carefully at the kind of principle the individual form is intended to be and therefore the role it plays in making each of us individual. In order to do so, it is necessary to look at Stein’s general theory of essence and essential structures (chapter 3), her account of being (chapter 4), and the way in which individual forms in particular fit into Stein’s account of both and thus act as a...

Stein’s account of the types of and relations among the essential structures is relatively complex. What allows her to make the distinctions that she does is her concept of essential being.¹ Stein does not think that being is identical with actuality. Rather, she thinks that “being” can be said in at least three ways. In the following, I would like to lay out her view of three kinds of being, focusing particularly on essential being (wesenhaftes Sein),² and show how her understanding of essential being leads her to a Scotist rather than a Thomistic position regarding universals. For Stein, as...

I would like to turn to Stein’s theory of individuation and individuality in light of the claims laid out in the previous two chapters regarding essentialities, essences, and essential being. As seen there, Stein distinguishes essences, which are capable of temporal unfolding and which are the essence of something, from essentialities, which are atemporal and (in some sense) ground the essences. Stein further claims that both essences and essentialities have a distinctive being as essential structures. This essential being can be contrasted with actual being, even if it is not independent of such actual being. In chapter 4 of Finite...

Many philosophers—Descartes, for example—argue that if something is genuinely distinct, it must also be separable, at least by God.¹ In contrast, Thomas argues that two things may be distinct but inseparable. For example, the substantial form and the matter of a bird are truly distinct, but nonetheless inseparable.² If there is no matter, there is no bird; if there is no form, there is no bird; but the form is nonetheless utterly distinct from the matter, even though dependent on the matter for its actualization. In claiming that form and matter for the bird are inseparable, Thomas is...

Insofar as she has presupposed Husserl’s mereology, Stein has a clear way of understanding the relation between individual and universal form which preserves not only the genuine commonality of our human nature but also the essential uniqueness (in the weaker sense) of each person. Furthermore, with this model Stein can also account for the genuine unity of each person. We are not merely a collection of parts but a true whole, one being. There is a single carrier (the substantial form) of our nature, which can be distinguished according to a number of distinct but interconnected moments, including both our...

Stein shares with the Christian tradition, in a way that Aristotle did not, a concern for the individual and for the value of each and every individual. Each individual is not merely a means for the continuation of the species but is, rather, immeasurably valuable in the eyes of God. Stein has a beautiful passage about watching long lines of soldiers marching by; they form a mass where each conforms to all the others, all steps perfectly paced off. And yet the eyes of love—the eyes of the mother or bride—pick out a particular individual. They anxiously wait...

The idea that there is something each of us as an individual ought to be strikes a deep chord. Most of us have met people who are deeply, deeply distinctive and yet profoundly authentic and truly themselves. And we can contrast these with others who seem to have taken on habits and mannerisms simply for the sake of standing out, being “unique”; something about their way of doing so rings false. Those closest to such people can often recognize what is part of “the act” and what is essential to “the real person.” Stein’s a priori individual forms offer one...

Stein’s conception of the human individual is beautiful, and she articulates well an experience all of us have had of the uniqueness of each person we truly love. We do not love a human being, but this particular person. Stein’s focus on individuality—and what it means to be oneself—is exceedingly valuable and challenging. There is certainly an emphasis (and a right and good one) in our culture, both philosophical and social, on individual uniqueness and “being true” to oneself. There is something convincing about the idea that there is a predictable structure to our personalities, and I have...