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The Federalist Papers

The Federalist Papers

ALEXANDER HAMILTON
JAMES MADISON
JOHN JAY
Edited and with an Introduction by Ian Shapiro
John Dunn
Donald L. Horowitz
Eileen Hunt Botting
Copyright Date: 2009
Published by: Yale University Press
Pages: 608
https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt5vm398
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  • Book Info
    The Federalist Papers
    Book Description:

    This authoritative edition of the complete texts of theFederalist Papers,the Articles of Confederation, the U.S. Constitution, and the Amendments to the U.S. Constitution features supporting essays in which leading scholars provide historical context and analysis.

    An introduction by Ian Shapiro offers an overview of the publication of theFederalistPapersand their importance. In three additional essays, John Dunn explores the composition of theFederalist Papersand the conflicting agendas of its authors; Eileen Hunt Botting explains how early advocates of women's rights, most prominently Mercy Otis Warren, Judith Sargent Murray, and Charles Brockden Brown, responded to the Federalist-Antifederalist debates; and Donald Horowitz discusses theFederalist Papersfrom the perspective of recent experiments with democracy and constitution-making around the world. These essays both illuminate the original texts and encourage active engagement with them.

    eISBN: 978-0-300-16104-5
    Subjects: History, Political Science

Table of Contents

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  1. Front Matter
    (pp. i-vi)
  2. Table of Contents
    (pp. vii-viii)
  3. Introduction: The Federalist Then and Now
    (pp. ix-xxii)
    IAN SHAPIRO

    Great works of political theory are sometimes written for the ages. They might be occasioned by particular challenges and events, but at least one authorial eye is fixed firmly on posterity. Aristotle’sPolitics, Bentham’sIntroduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, and Hegel’sPhilosophy of Rightare all works of that sort. They were conceived of as comprehensive, if not definitive, treatments of their subjects.

    But some writings on politics achieve lasting recognition even though they are products of more local aspirations. Machiavelli’sIl Principe, Burke’sReflections on the Revolution in France, and Marx’sOn the Jewish Questionwere...

  4. Texts

    • The Federalist Papers

      • The Federalist No. 1 INTRODUCTION
        (pp. 7-10)
        Alexander Hamilton

        To the People of the State of New York:

        After an unequivocal experience of the inefficacy of the subsisting federal government, you are called upon to deliberate on a new Constitution for the United States of America. The subject speaks its own importance; comprehending in its consequences nothing less than the existence of the union, the safety and welfare of the parts of which it is composed, the fate of an empire in many respects the most interesting in the world. It has been frequently remarked that it seems to have been reserved to the people of this country, by...

      • The Federalist No. 2 CONCERNING DANGERS FROM FOREIGN FORCE AND INFLUENCE
        (pp. 11-14)
        John Jay

        To the People of the State of New York:

        When the people of America reflect that they are now called upon to decide a question, which, in its consequences, must prove one of the most important that ever engaged their attention, the propriety of their taking a very comprehensive, as well as a very serious, view of it, will be evident.

        Nothing is more certain than the indispensable necessity of government, and it is equally undeniable, that whenever and however it is instituted, the people must cede to it some of their natural rights in order to vest it with...

      • The Federalist No. 3 THE SAME SUBJECT (CONCERNING DANGERS FROM FOREIGN FORCE AND INFLUENCE) CONTINUED
        (pp. 15-18)
        John Jay

        To the People of the State of New York:

        It is not a new observation that the people of any country (if, like the Americans, intelligent and well-informed) seldom adopt and steadily persevere for many years in an erroneous opinion respecting their interests. That consideration naturally tends to create great respect for the high opinion which the people of America have so long and uniformly entertained of the importance of their continuing firmly united under one federal government, vested with sufficient powers for all general and national purposes.

        The more attentively I consider and investigate the reasons which appear to...

      • The Federalist No. 4 THE SAME SUBJECT (CONCERNING DANGERS FROM FOREIGN FORCE AND INFLUENCE) CONTINUED
        (pp. 18-22)
        John Jay

        To the People of the State of New York:

        My last paper assigned several reasons why the safety of the people would be best secured by union against the danger it may be exposed to byjustcauses of war given to other nations; and those reasons show that such causes would not only be more rarely given, but would also be more easily accommodated, by a national government than either by the State governments or the proposed little confederacies.

        But the safety of the people of America against dangers fromforeignforce depends not only on their forbearing to...

      • The Federalist No. 5 THE SAME SUBJECT (CONCERNING DANGERS FROM FOREIGN FORCE AND INFLUENCE) CONTINUED
        (pp. 22-25)
        John Jay

        To the People of the State of New York:

        Queen anne, in her letter of the 1st July, 1706, to the Scotch Parliament, makes some observations on the importance of theUnionthen forming between England and Scotland, which merit our attention. I shall present the public with one or two extracts from it: “An entire and perfect union will be the solid foundation of lasting peace: It will secure your religion, liberty, and property; remove the animosities amongst yourselves, and the jealousies and differences betwixt our two kingdoms. It must increase your strength, riches, and trade; and by this...

      • The Federalist No. 6 CONCERNING DANGERS FROM DISSENSIONS BETWEEN THE STATES
        (pp. 26-31)
        Alexander Hamilton

        To the People of the State of New York:

        The three last numbers of this paper have been dedicated to an enumeration of the dangers to which we should be exposed, in a state of disunion, from the arms and arts of foreign nations. I shall now proceed to delineate dangers of a different and, perhaps, still more alarming kind—those which will in all probability flow from dissensions between the States themselves, and from domestic factions and convulsions. These have been already in some instances slightly anticipated; but they deserve a more particular and more full investigation.

        A man...

      • The Federalist No. 7 THE SAME SUBJECT (CONCERNING DANGERS FROM DISSENSIONS BETWEEN THE STATES) CONTINUED
        (pp. 31-36)
        Alexander Hamilton

        To the People of the State of New York:

        It is sometimes asked, with an air of seeming triumph, what inducements could the States have, if disunited, to make war upon each other? It would be a full answer to this question to say — precisely the same inducements which have, at different times, deluged in blood all the nations in the world. But, unfortunately for us, the question admits of a more particular answer. There are causes of differences within our immediate contemplation, of the tendency of which, even under the restraints of a federal constitution, we have had...

      • The Federalist No. 8 THE CONSEQUENCES OF HOSTILITIES BETWEEN THE STATES
        (pp. 37-41)
        Alexander Hamilton

        To the People of the State of New York:

        Assuming it therefore as an established truth that the several States, in case of disunion, or such combinations of them as might happen to be formed out of the wreck of the general Confederacy, would be subject to those vicissitudes of peace and war, of friendship and enmity, with each other, which have fallen to the lot of all neighboring nations not united under one government, let us enter into a concise detail of some of the consequences that would attend such a situation.

        War between the States, in the first...

      • The Federalist No. 9 THE UTILITY OF THE UNION AS A SAFEGUARD AGAINST DOMESTIC FACTION AND INSURRECTION
        (pp. 42-46)
        Alexander Hamilton

        To the People of the State of New York:

        A firm Union will be of the utmost moment to the peace and liberty of the States, as a barrier against domestic faction and insurrection. It is impossible to read the history of the petty republics of Greece and Italy without feeling sensations of horror and disgust at the distractions with which they were continually agitated, and at the rapid succession of revolutions by which they were kept in a state of perpetual vibration between the extremes of tyranny and anarchy. If they exhibit occasional calms, these only serve as short-lived...

      • The Federalist No. 10 THE SAME SUBJECT (THE UTILITY OF THE UNION AS A SAFEGUARD AGAINST DOMESTIC FACTION AND INSURRECTION) CONTINUED
        (pp. 47-53)
        James Madison

        To the People of the State of New York:

        Among the numerous advantages promised by a well constructed Union, none deserves to be more accurately developed than its tendency to break and control the violence of faction. The friend of popular governments never finds himself so much alarmed for their character and fate, as when he contemplates their propensity to this dangerous vice. He will not fail, therefore, to set a due value on any plan which, without violating the principles to which he is attached, provides a proper cure for it. The instability, injustice, and confusion introduced into the...

      • The Federalist No. 11 THE UTILITY OF THE UNION IN RESPECT TO COMMERCIAL RELATIONS AND A NAVY
        (pp. 54-59)
        Alexander Hamilton

        To the People of the State of New York:

        The importance of the Union, in a commercial light, is one of those points about which there is least room to entertain a difference of opinion, and which has, in fact, commanded the most general assent of men who have any acquaintance with the subject. This applies as well to our intercourse with foreign countries as with each other.

        There are appearances to authorize a supposition that the adventurous spirit, which distinguishes the commercial character of America, has already excited uneasy sensations in several of the maritime powers of Europe. They...

      • The Federalist No. 12 THE UTILITY OF THE UNION IN RESPECT TO REVENUE
        (pp. 59-64)
        Alexander Hamilton

        To the People of the State of New York:

        The effects of Union upon the commercial prosperity of the States have been sufficiently delineated. Its tendency to promote the interests of revenue will be the subject of our present inquiry.

        The prosperity of commerce is now perceived and acknowledged by all enlightened statesmen to be the most useful as well as the most productive source of national wealth, and has accordingly become a primary object of their political cares. By multiplying the means of gratification, by promoting the introduction and circulation of the precious metals, those darling objects of human...

      • The Federalist No. 13 ADVANTAGE OF THE UNION IN RESPECT TO ECONOMY IN GOVERNMENT
        (pp. 64-66)
        Alexander Hamilton

        To the People of the State of New York:

        As connected with the subject of revenue, we may with propriety consider that of economy. The money saved from one object may be usefully applied to another, and there will be so much the less to be drawn from the pockets of the people. If the States are united under one government, there will be but one national civil list to support; if they are divided into several confederacies, there will be as many different national civil lists to be provided for—and each of them, as to the principal departments,...

      • The Federalist No. 14 OBJECTIONS TO THE PROPOSED CONSTITUTION FROM EXTENT OF TERRITORY ANSWERED
        (pp. 67-71)
        James Madison

        To the People of the State of New York:

        We have seen the necessity of the Union, as our bulwark against foreign danger, as the conservator of peace among ourselves, as the guardian of our commerce and other common interests, as the only substitute for those military establishments which have subverted the liberties of the Old World, and as the proper antidote for the diseases of faction, which have proved fatal to other popular governments, and of which alarming symptoms have been betrayed by our own. All that remains, within this branch of our inquiries, is to take notice of...

      • The Federalist No. 15 THE INSUFFICIENCY OF THE PRESENT CONFEDERATION TO PRESERVE THE UNION
        (pp. 72-78)
        Alexander Hamilton

        To the People of the State of New York:

        In the course of the preceding papers, I have endeavored, my fellow citizens, to place before you, in a clear and convincing light, the importance of Union to your political safety and happiness. I have unfolded to you a complication of dangers to which you would be exposed, should you permit that sacred knot which binds the people of America together be severed or dissolved by ambition or by avarice, by jealousy or by misrepresentation. In the sequel of the inquiry through which I propose to accompany you, the truths intended...

      • The Federalist No. 16 THE SAME SUBJECT (THE INSUFFICIENCY OF THE PRESENT CONFEDERATION TO PRESERVE THE UNION) CONTINUED
        (pp. 79-83)
        Alexander Hamilton

        To the People of the State of New York:

        The tendency of the principle of legislation for States, or communities, in their political capacities, as it has been exemplified by the experiment we have made of it, is equally attested by the events which have befallen all other governments of the confederate kind, of which we have any account, in exact proportion to its prevalence in those systems. The confirmations of this fact will be worthy of a distinct and particular examination. I shall content myself with barely observing here, that of all the confederacies of antiquity, which history has...

      • The Federalist No. 17 THE SAME SUBJECT (THE INSUFFICIENCY OF THE PRESENT CONFEDERATION TO PRESERVE THE UNION) CONTINUED
        (pp. 84-87)
        Alexander Hamilton

        To the People of the State of New York:

        An objection, of a nature different from that which has been stated and answered, in my last address, may perhaps be likewise urged against the principle of legislation for the individual citizens of America. It may be said that it would tend to render the government of the Union too powerful, and to enable it to absorb those residuary authorities, which it might be judged proper to leave with the States for local purposes. Allowing the utmost latitude to the love of power which any reasonable man can require, I confess...

      • The Federalist No. 18 THE SAME SUBJECT (THE INSUFFICIENCY OF THE PRESENT CONFEDERATION TO PRESERVE THE UNION) CONTINUED
        (pp. 88-93)
        James Madison and Alexander Hamilton

        To the People of the State of New York:

        Among the confederacies of antiquity, the most considerable was that of the Grecian republics, associated under the Amphictyonic council. From the best accounts transmitted of this celebrated institution, it bore a very instructive analogy to the present Confederation of the American States.

        The members retained the character of independent and sovereign states, and had equal votes in the federal council. This council had a general authority to propose and resolve whatever it judged necessary for the common welfare of Greece; to declare and carry on war; to decide, in the last...

      • The Federalist No. 19 THE SAME SUBJECT (THE INSUFFICIENCY OF THE PRESENT CONFEDERATION TO PRESERVE THE UNION) CONTINUED
        (pp. 93-98)
        James Madison and Alexander Hamilton

        To the People of the State of New York:

        The examples of ancient confederacies, cited in my last paper, have not exhausted the source of experimental instruction on this subject. There are existing institutions, founded on a similar principle, which merit particular consideration. The first which presents itself is the Germanic body.

        In the early ages of Christianity, Germany was occupied by seven distinct nations, who had no common chief. The Franks, one of the number, having conquered the Gauls, established the kingdom which has taken its name from them. In the ninth century Charlemagne, its warlike monarch, carried his...

      • The Federalist No. 20 THE SAME SUBJECT (THE INSUFFICIENCY OF THE PRESENT CONFEDERATION TO PRESERVE THE UNION) CONTINUED
        (pp. 98-102)
        James Madison and Alexander Hamilton

        To the People of the State of New York:

        The United Netherlands are a confederacy of republics, or rather of aristocracies of a very remarkable texture, yet confirming all the lessons derived from those which we have already reviewed.

        The union is composed of seven coequal and sovereign states, and each state or province is a composition of equal and independent cities. In all important cases, not only the provinces but the cities must be unanimous.

        The sovereignty of the Union is represented by the States-General, consisting usually of about fifty deputies appointed by the provinces. They hold their seats,...

      • The Federalist No. 21 OTHER DEFECTS OF THE PRESENT CONFEDERATION
        (pp. 102-106)
        Alexander Hamilton

        To the People of the State of New York:

        Having in the three last numbers taken a summary review of the principal circumstances and events which have depicted the genius and fate of other confederate governments, I shall now proceed in the enumeration of the most important of those defects which have hitherto disappointed our hopes from the system established among ourselves. To form a safe and satisfactory judgment of the proper remedy, it is absolutely necessary that we should be well acquainted with the extent and malignity of the disease.

        The next most palpable defect of the subsisting Confederation,...

      • The Federalist No. 22 THE SAME SUBJECT (OTHER DEFECTS OF THE PRESENT CONFEDERATION) CONTINUED
        (pp. 107-114)
        Alexander Hamilton

        To the People of the State of New York:

        In addition to the defects already enumerated in the existing federal system, there are others of not less importance, which concur in rendering it altogether unfit for the administration of the affairs of the Union.

        The want of a power to regulate commerce is by all parties allowed to be of the number. The utility of such a power has been anticipated under the first head of our inquiries; and for this reason, as well as from the universal conviction entertained upon the subject, little need be added in this place....

      • The Federalist No. 23 THE NECESSITY OF A GOVERNMENT AS ENERGETIC AS THE ONE PROPOSED TO THE PRESERVATION OF THE UNION
        (pp. 115-119)
        Alexander Hamilton

        To the People of the State of New York:

        The necessity of a Constitution, at least equally energetic with the one proposed, to the preservation of the Union, is the point at the examination of which we are now arrived.

        This inquiry will naturally divide itself into three branches—the objects to be provided for by the federal government, the quantity of power necessary to the accomplishment of those objects, the persons upon whom that power ought to operate. Its distribution and organization will more properly claim our attention under the succeeding head.

        The principal purposes to be answered by...

      • The Federalist No. 24 THE POWERS NECESSARY TO THE COMMON DEFENSE FURTHER CONSIDERED
        (pp. 119-123)
        Alexander Hamilton

        To the People of the State of New York:

        To the powers proposed to be conferred upon the federal government, in respect to the creation and direction of the national forces, I have met with but one specific objection, which, if I understand it right, is this, that proper provision has not been made against the existence of standing armies in time of peace; an objection which, I shall now endeavor to show, rests on weak and unsubstantial foundations.

        It has indeed been brought forward in the most vague and general form, supported only by bold assertions, without the appearance...

      • The Federalist No. 25 THE SAME SUBJECT (THE POWERS NECESSARY TO THE COMMON DEFENSE FURTHER CONSIDERED) CONTINUED
        (pp. 124-128)
        Alexander Hamilton

        To the People of the State of New York:

        It may perhaps be urged that the objects enumerated in the preceding number ought to be provided for by the State governments, under the direction of the Union. But this would be, in reality, an inversion of the primary principle of our political association, as it would in practice transfer the care of the common defense from the federal head to the individual members: a project oppressive to some States, dangerous to all, and baneful to the Confederacy.

        The territories of Britain, Spain, and of the Indian nations in our neighborhood...

      • The Federalist No. 26 THE IDEA OF RESTRAINING THE LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY IN REGARD TO THE COMMON DEFENSE CONSIDERED
        (pp. 128-133)
        Alexander Hamilton

        To the People of the State of New York:

        It was a thing hardly to be expected that in a popular revolution the minds of men should stop at that happy mean which marks the salutary boundary between power and privilege, and combines the energy of government with the security of private rights. A failure in this delicate and important point is the great source of the inconveniences we experience, and if we are not cautious to avoid a repetition of the error, in our future attempts to rectify and ameliorate our system, we may travel from one chimerical project...

      • The Federalist No. 27 THE SAME SUBJECT (THE IDEA OF RESTRAINING THE LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY IN REGARD TO THE COMMON DEFENSE CONSIDERED) CONTINUED
        (pp. 134-137)
        Alexander Hamilton

        To the People of the State of New York:

        It has been urged, in different shapes, that a Constitution of the kind proposed by the convention cannot operate without the aid of a military force to execute its laws. This, however, like most other things that have been alleged on that side, rests on mere general assertion, unsupported by any precise or intelligible designation of the reasons upon which it is founded. As far as I have been able to divine the latent meaning of the objectors, it seems to originate in a presupposition that the people will be disinclined...

      • The Federalist No. 28 THE SAME SUBJECT (THE IDEA OF RESTRAINING THE LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY IN REGARD TO THE COMMON DEFENSE CONSIDERED) CONTINUED
        (pp. 137-141)
        Alexander Hamilton

        To the People of the State of New York:

        That there may happen cases in which the national government may be necessitated to resort to force, cannot be denied. Our own experience has corroborated the lessons taught by the examples of other nations; that emergencies of this sort will sometimes arise in all societies, however constituted; that seditions and insurrections are, unhappily, maladies as inseparable from the body politic as tumors and eruptions from the natural body; that the idea of governing at all times by the simple force of law (which we have been told is the only admissible...

      • The Federalist No. 29 CONCERNING THE MILITIA
        (pp. 141-146)
        Alexander Hamilton

        To the People of the State of New York:

        The power of regulating the militia, and of commanding its services in times of insurrection and invasion are natural incidents to the duties of superintending the common defense, and of watching over the internal peace of the Confederacy.

        It requires no skill in the science of war to discern that uniformity in the organization and discipline of the militia would be attended with the most beneficial effects, whenever they were called into service for the public defense. It would enable them to discharge the duties of the camp and of the...

      • The Federalist No. 30 CONCERNING THE GENERAL POWER OF TAXATION
        (pp. 146-150)
        Alexander Hamilton

        To the People of the State of New York:

        It has been already observed that the federal government ought to possess the power of providing for the support of the national forces; in which proposition was intended to be included the expense of raising troops, of building and equipping fleets, and all other expenses in any wise connected with military arrangements and operations. But these are not the only objects to which the jurisdiction of the Union, in respect to revenue, must necessarily be empowered to extend. It must embrace a provision for the support of the national civil list;...

      • The Federalist No. 31 THE SAME SUBJECT (CONCERNING THE GENERAL POWER OF TAXATION) CONTINUED
        (pp. 151-154)
        Alexander Hamilton

        To the People of the State of New York:

        In disquisitions of every kind, there are certain primary truths, or first principles, upon which all subsequent reasonings must depend. These contain an internal evidence which, antecedent to all reflection or combination, commands the assent of the mind. Where it produces not this effect, it must proceed either from some defect or disorder in the organs of perception, or from the influence of some strong interest, or passion, or prejudice. Of this nature are the maxims in geometry, that “the whole is greater than its part; things equal to the same...

      • The Federalist No. 32 THE SAME SUBJECT (CONCERNING THE GENERAL POWER OF TAXATION) CONTINUED
        (pp. 155-158)
        Alexander Hamilton

        To the People of the State of New York:

        Although I am of opinion that there would be no real danger of the consequences which seem to be apprehended to the State governments from a power in the Union to control them in the levies of money, because I am persuaded that the sense of the people, the extreme hazard of provoking the resentments of the State governments, and a conviction of the utility and necessity of local administrations for local purposes, would be a complete barrier against the oppressive use of such a power; yet I am willing here...

      • The Federalist No. 33 THE SAME SUBJECT (CONCERNING THE GENERAL POWER OF TAXATION) CONTINUED
        (pp. 158-162)
        Alexander Hamilton

        To the People of the State of New York:

        The residue of the argument against the provisions of the Constitution in respect to taxation is ingrafted upon the following clause. The last clause of the eighth section of the first article of the plan under consideration authorizes the national legislature “to make all laws which shall benecessaryandproperfor carrying into executionthe powersby that Constitution vested in the government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof”; and the second clause of the sixth article declares, “that the Constitution and the laws of...

      • The Federalist No. 34 THE SAME SUBJECT (CONCERNING THE GENERAL POWER OF TAXATION) CONTINUED
        (pp. 162-167)
        Alexander Hamilton

        To the People of the State of New York:

        I flatter myself it has been clearly shown in my last number that the particular States, under the proposed Constitution, would have coequal authority with the Union in the article of revenue, except as to duties on imports. As this leaves open to the States far the greatest part of the resources of the community, there can be no color for the assertion that they would not possess means as abundant as could be desired for the supply of their own wants, independent of all external control. That the field is...

      • The Federalist No. 35 THE SAME SUBJECT (CONCERNING THE GENERAL POWER OF TAXATION) CONTINUED
        (pp. 167-172)
        Alexander Hamilton

        To the People of the State of New York:

        Before we proceed to examine any other objections to an indefinite power of taxation in the Union, I shall make one general remark; which is, that if the jurisdiction of the national government, in the article of revenue, should be restricted to particular objects, it would naturally occasion an undue proportion of the public burdens to fall upon those objects. Two evils would spring from this source: the oppression of particular branches of industry; and an unequal distribution of the taxes, as well among the several States as among the citizens...

      • The Federalist No. 36 THE SAME SUBJECT (CONCERNING THE GENERAL POWER OF TAXATION) CONTINUED
        (pp. 172-178)
        Alexander Hamilton

        To the People of the State of New York:

        We have seen that the result of the observations, to which the foregoing number has been principally devoted, is, that from the natural operation of the different interests and views of the various classes of the community, whether the representation of the people be more or less numerous, it will consist almost entirely of proprietors of land, of merchants, and of members of the learned professions, who will truly represent all those different interests and views. If it should be objected that we have seen other descriptions of men in the...

      • The Federalist No. 37 CONCERNING THE DIFFICULTIES OF THE CONVENTION IN DEVISING A PROPER FORM OF GOVERNMENT
        (pp. 179-185)
        James Madison

        To the People of the State of New York:

        In reviewing the defects of the existing Confederation, and showing that they cannot be supplied by a government of less energy than that before the public, several of the most important principles of the latter fell of course under consideration. But as the ultimate object of these papers is to determine clearly and fully the merits of this Constitution, and the expediency of adopting it, our plan cannot be complete without taking a more critical and thorough survey of the work of the convention, without examining it on all its sides,...

      • The Federalist No. 38 THE SAME SUBJECT (CONCERNING THE DIFFICULTIES OF THE CONVENTION IN DEVISING A PROPER FORM OF GOVERNMENT) CONTINUED, AND THE INCOHERENCE OF THE OBJECTIONS TO THE NEW PLAN EXPOSED
        (pp. 185-192)
        James Madison

        To the People of the State of New York:

        It is not a little remarkable that in every case reported by ancient history, in which government has been established with deliberation and consent, the task of framing it has not been committed to an assembly of men, but has been performed by some individual citizen of preeminent wisdom and approved integrity.

        Minos, we learn, was the primitive founder of the government of Crete, as Zaleucus was of that of the Locrians. Theseus first, and after him Draco and Solon, instituted the government of Athens. Lycurgus was the lawgiver of Sparta....

      • The Federalist No. 39 THE CONFORMITY OF THE PLAN TO REPUBLICAN PRINCIPLES
        (pp. 192-198)
        James Madison

        To the People of the State of New York:

        The last paper having concluded the observations which were meant to introduce a candid survey of the plan of government reported by the convention, we now proceed to the execution of that part of our undertaking.

        The first question that offers itself is, whether the general form and aspect of the government be strictly republican. It is evident that no other form would be reconcilable with the genius of the people of America; with the fundamental principles of the Revolution; or with that honorable determination which animates every votary of freedom,...

      • The Federalist No. 40 THE POWERS OF THE CONVENTION TO FORM A MIXED GOVERNMENT EXAMINED AND SUSTAINED
        (pp. 198-205)
        James Madison

        To the People of the State of New York:

        Thesecondpoint to be examined is, whether the convention were authorized to frame and propose this mixed Constitution.

        The powers of the convention ought, in strictness, to be determined by an inspection of the commissions given to the members by their respective constituents. As all of these, however, had reference, either to the recommendation from the meeting at Annapolis, in September, 1786, or to that from Congress, in February, 1787, it will be sufficient to recur to these particular acts.

        The act from Annapolis recommends the “appointment of commissioners to...

      • The Federalist No. 41 GENERAL VIEW OF THE POWERS CONFERRED BY THE CONSTITUTION
        (pp. 205-213)
        James Madison

        To the People of the State of New York:

        The Constitution proposed by the convention may be considered under two general points of view. The first relates to the sum or quantity of power which it vests in the government, including the restraints imposed on the States. The second, to the particular structure of the government, and the distribution of this power among its several branches.

        Under thefirstview of the subject, two important questions arise: 1. Whether any part of the powers transferred to the general government be unnecessary or improper? 2. Whether the entire mass of them...

      • The Federalist No. 42 THE POWERS CONFERRED BY THE CONSTITUTION FURTHER CONSIDERED
        (pp. 213-219)
        James Madison

        To the People of the State of New York:

        Thesecondclass of powers, lodged in the general government, consists of those which regulate the intercourse with foreign nations, to wit: to make treaties; to send and receive ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls; to define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and offenses against the law of nations; to regulate foreign commerce, including a power to prohibit, after the year 1808, the importation of slaves, and to lay an intermediate duty of ten dollars per head, as a discouragement to such importations.

        This class of...

      • The Federalist No. 43 THE SAME SUBJECT (THE POWERS CONFERRED BY THE CONSTITUTION FURTHER CONSIDERED) CONTINUED
        (pp. 219-227)
        James Madison

        To the People of the State of New York:

        Thefourthclass comprises the following miscellaneous powers:

        1. A power “to promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing, for a limited time, to authors and inventors, the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries.”

        The utility of this power will scarcely be questioned. The copyright of authors has been solemnly adjudged, in Great Britain, to be a right of common law. The right to useful inventions seems with equal reason to belong to the inventors. The public good fully coincides in both cases with the claims of...

      • The Federalist No. 44 RESTRICTIONS ON THE AUTHORITY OF THE SEVERAL STATES
        (pp. 227-233)
        James Madison

        To the People of the State of New York:

        Afifthclass of provisions in favor of the federal authority consists of the following restrictions on the authority of the several States:

        1. “No State shall enter into any treaty, alliance, or confederation; grant letters of marque and reprisal; coin money; emit bills of credit; make any thing but gold and silver a legal tender in payment of debts; pass any bill of attainder,ex post factolaw, or law impairing the obligation of contracts; or grant any title of nobility.”

        The prohibition against treaties, alliances, and confederations makes a part...

      • The Federalist No. 45 THE ALLEGED DANGER FROM THE POWERS OF THE UNION TO THE STATE GOVERNMENTS CONSIDERED
        (pp. 234-238)
        James Madison

        To the People of the State of New York:

        Having shown that no one of the powers transferred to the federal government is unnecessary or improper, the next question to be considered is, whether the whole mass of them will be dangerous to the portion of authority left in the several States.

        The adversaries to the plan of the convention, instead of considering in the first place what degree of power was absolutely necessary for the purposes of the federal government, have exhausted themselves in a secondary inquiry into the possible consequences of the proposed degree of power to the...

      • The Federalist No. 46 THE INFLUENCE OF THE STATE AND FEDERAL GOVERNMENTS COMPARED
        (pp. 239-244)
        James Madison

        To the People of the State of New York:

        Resuming the subject of the last paper, I proceed to inquire whether the federal government or the State governments will have the advantage with regard to the predilection and support of the people. Notwithstanding the different modes in which they are appointed, we must consider both of them as substantially dependent on the great body of the citizens of the United States. I assume this position here as it respects the first, reserving the proofs for another place. The federal and State governments are in fact but different agents and trustees...

      • The Federalist No. 47 THE PARTICULAR STRUCTURE OF THE NEW GOVERNMENT AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF POWER AMONG ITS DIFFERENT PARTS
        (pp. 245-251)
        James Madison

        To the People of the State of New York:

        Having reviewed the general form of the proposed government and the general mass of power allotted to it, I proceed to examine the particular structure of this government, and the distribution of this mass of power among its constituent parts.

        One of the principal objections inculcated by the more respectable adversaries to the Constitution, is its supposed violation of the political maxim, that the legislative, executive, and judiciary departments ought to be separate and distinct. In the structure of the federal government, no regard, it is said, seems to have been...

      • The Federalist No. 48 THESE DEPARTMENTS SHOULD NOT BE SO FAR SEPARATED AS TO HAVE NO CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROL OVER EACH OTHER
        (pp. 251-255)
        James Madison

        To the People of the State of New York:

        It was shown in the last paper that the political apothegm there examined does not require that the legislative, executive, and judiciary departments should be wholly unconnected with each other. I shall undertake, in the next place, to show that unless these departments be so far connected and blended as to give to each a constitutional control over the others, the degree of separation which the maxim requires, as essential to a free government, can never in practice be duly maintained.

        It is agreed on all sides, that the powers properly...

      • The Federalist No. 49 METHOD OF GUARDING AGAINST THE ENCROACHMENTS OF ANY ONE DEPARTMENT OF GOVERNMENT BY APPEALING TO THE PEOPLE THROUGH A CONVENTION
        (pp. 256-259)
        James Madison

        To the People of the State of New York:

        The author of theNotes on the State of Virginia,quoted in the last paper, has subjoined to that valuable work the draught of a constitution, which had been prepared in order to be laid before a convention, expected to be called in 1783, by the legislature, for the establishment of a constitution for that commonwealth. The plan, like every thing from the same pen, marks a turn of thinking, original, comprehensive, and accurate; and is the more worthy of attention as it equally displays a fervent attachment to republican government...

      • The Federalist No. 50 PERIODICAL APPEALS TO THE PEOPLE CONSIDERED
        (pp. 260-262)
        James Madison

        To the People of the State of New York:

        It may be contended, perhaps, that instead ofoccasionalappeals to the people, which are liable to the objections urged against them,periodicalappeals are the proper and adequate means ofpreventing and correcting infractions of the Constitution.

        It will be attended to, that in the examination of these expedients, I confine myself to their aptitude forenforcingthe Constitution, by keeping the several departments of power within their due bounds, without particularly considering them as provisions foralteringthe Constitution itself. In the first view, appeals to the people at...

      • The Federalist No. 51 THE STRUCTURE OF THE GOVERNMENT MUST FURNISH THE PROPER CHECKS AND BALANCES BETWEEN THE DIFFERENT DEPARTMENTS
        (pp. 263-267)
        James Madison

        To the People of the State of New York:

        To what expedient, then, shall we finally resort, for maintaining in practice the necessary partition of power among the several departments, as laid down in the Constitution? The only answer that can be given is, that as all these exterior provisions are found to be inadequate, the defect must be supplied, by so contriving the interior structure of the government as that its several constituent parts may, by their mutual relations, be the means of keeping each other in their proper places. Without presuming to undertake a full development of this...

      • The Federalist No. 52 THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
        (pp. 267-271)
        James Madison

        To the People of the State of New York:

        From the more general inquiries pursued in the four last papers, I pass on to a more particular examination of the several parts of the government. I shall begin with the House of Representatives.

        The first view to be taken of this part of the government relates to the qualifications of the electors and the elected. Those of the former are to be the same with those of the electors of the most numerous branch of the State legislatures. The definition of the right of suffrage is very justly regarded as...

      • The Federalist No. 53 THE SAME SUBJECT (THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES) CONTINUED
        (pp. 272-276)
        James Madison

        To the People of the State of New York:

        I shall here, perhaps, be reminded of a current observation, “that where annual elections end, tyranny begins.” If it be true, as has often been remarked, that sayings which become proverbial are generally founded in reason, it is not less true, that when once established, they are often applied to cases to which the reason of them does not extend. I need not look for a proof beyond the case before us. What is the reason on which this proverbial observation is founded? No man will subject himself to the ridicule...

      • The Federalist No. 54 THE APPORTIONMENT OF MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AMONG THE STATES
        (pp. 277-281)
        James Madison

        To the People of the State of New York:

        The next view which I shall take of the House of Representatives relates to the appointment of its members to the several States which is to be determined by the same rule with that of direct taxes.

        It is not contended that the number of people in each State ought not to be the standard for regulating the proportion of those who are to represent the people of each State. The establishment of the same rule for the appointment of taxes, will probably be as little contested; though the rule itself...

      • The Federalist No. 55 THE TOTAL NUMBER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
        (pp. 281-286)
        James Madison

        To the People of the State of New York:

        The number of which the House of Representatives is to consist, forms another and a very interesting point of view, under which this branch of the federal legislature may be contemplated. Scarce any article, indeed, in the whole Constitution seems to be rendered more worthy of attention, by the weight of character and the apparent force of argument with which it has been assailed. The charges exhibited against it are, first, that so small a number of representatives will be an unsafe depositary of the public interests; secondly, that they will...

      • The Federalist No. 56 THE SAME SUBJECT (THE TOTAL NUMBER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES) CONTINUED
        (pp. 286-289)
        James Madison

        To the People of the State of New York:

        Thesecondcharge against the House of Representatives is, that it will be too small to possess a due knowledge of the interests of its constituents.

        As this objection evidently proceeds from a comparison of the proposed number of representatives with the great extent of the United States, the number of their inhabitants, and the diversity of their interests, without taking into view at the same time the circumstances which will distinguish the Congress from other legislative bodies, the best answer that can be given to it will be a brief...

      • The Federalist No. 57 THE ALLEGED TENDENCY OF THE NEW PLAN TO ELEVATE THE FEW AT THE EXPENSE OF THE MANY CONSIDERED IN CONNECTION WITH REPRESENTATION
        (pp. 290-295)
        James Madison

        To the People of the State of New York:

        Thethirdcharge against the House of Representatives is, that it will be taken from that class of citizens which will have least sympathy with the mass of the people, and be most likely to aim at an ambitious sacrifice of the many to the aggrandizement of the few.

        Of all the objections which have been framed against the federal Constitution, this is perhaps the most extraordinary. Whilst the objection itself is levelled against a pretended oligarchy, the principle of it strikes at the very root of republican government.

        The aim...

      • The Federalist No. 58 OBJECTION THAT THE NUMBER OF MEMBERS WILL NOT BE AUGMENTED AS THE PROGRESS OF POPULATION DEMANDS CONSIDERED
        (pp. 295-300)
        James Madison

        To the People of the State of New York:

        The remaining charge against the House of Representatives, which I am to examine, is grounded on a supposition that the number of members will not be augmented from time to time, as the progress of population may demand.

        It has been admitted, that this objection, if well supported, would have great weight. The following observations will show that, like most other objections against the Constitution, it can only proceed from a partial view of the subject, or from a jealousy which discolors and disfigures every object which is beheld.

        1. Those who...

      • The Federalist No. 59 CONCERNING THE POWER OF CONGRESS TO REGULATE THE ELECTION OF MEMBERS
        (pp. 300-304)
        Alexander Hamilton

        To the People of the State of New York:

        The natural order of the subject leads us to consider, in this place, that provision of the Constitution which authorizes the national legislature to regulate, in the last resort, the election of its own members. It is in these words: “Thetimes, places,andmannerof holding elections for senators and representatives shall be prescribed in each State by the legislature thereof; but the Congress may, at any time, by law, make or altersuch regulations,except as to theplacesof choosing senators.”¹ This provision has not only been declaimed...

      • The Federalist No. 60 THE SAME SUBJECT (CONCERNING THE POWER OF CONGRESS TO REGULATE THE ELECTION OF MEMBERS) CONTINUED
        (pp. 304-309)
        Alexander Hamilton

        To the People of the State of New York:

        We have seen, that an uncontrollable power over the elections to the federal government could not, without hazard, be committed to the State legislatures. Let us now see, what would be the danger on the other side; that is, from confiding the ultimate right of regulating its own elections to the Union itself. It is not pretended, that this right would ever be used for the exclusion of any State from its share in the representation. The interest of all would, in this respect at least, be the security of all....

      • The Federalist No. 61 THE SAME SUBJECT (CONCERNING THE POWER OF CONGRESS TO REGULATE THE ELECTION OF MEMBERS) CONTINUED
        (pp. 309-312)
        Alexander Hamilton

        To the People of the State of New York:

        The more candid opposers of the provision respecting elections, contained in the plan of the convention, when pressed in argument, will sometimes concede the propriety of that provision; with this qualification, however, that it ought to have been accompanied with a declaration, that all elections should be had in the counties where the electors resided. This, say they, was a necessary precaution against an abuse of the power. A declaration of this nature would certainly have been harmless; so far as it would have had the effect of quieting apprehensions, it...

      • The Federalist No. 62 THE SENATE
        (pp. 313-318)
        James Madison

        To the People of the State of New York:

        Having examined the constitution of the House of Representatives, and answered such of the objections against it as seemed to merit notice, I enter next on the examination of the Senate. The heads into which this member of the government may be considered are: I. The qualification of senators; II. The appointment of them by the State legislatures; III. The equality of representation in the Senate; IV. The number of senators, and the term for which they are to be elected; V. The powers vested in the Senate.

        I. The qualifications...

      • The Federalist No. 63 THE SAME SUBJECT (THE SENATE) CONTINUED
        (pp. 318-325)
        James Madison

        To the People of the State of New York:

        Afifthdesideratum, illustrating the utility of a senate, is the want of a due sense of national character. Without a select and stable member of the government, the esteem of foreign powers will not only be forfeited by an unenlightened and variable policy, proceeding from the causes already mentioned, but the national councils will not possess that sensibility to the opinion of the world, which is perhaps not less necessary in order to merit, than it is to obtain, its respect and confidence.

        An attention to the judgment of other...

      • The Federalist No. 64 THE POWERS OF THE SENATE
        (pp. 325-330)
        John Jay

        To the People of the State of New York:

        It is a just and not a new observation, that enemies to particular persons, and opponents to particular measures, seldom confine their censures to such things only in either as are worthy of blame. Unless on this principle, it is difficult to explain the motives of their conduct, who condemn the proposed Constitution in the aggregate, and treat with severity some of the most unexceptionable articles in it.

        The second section gives power to the President, “by and with the advice and consent of the senate, to make treaties,provided two...

      • The Federalist No. 65 THE SAME SUBJECT (THE POWERS OF THE SENATE) CONTINUED
        (pp. 330-334)
        Alexander Hamilton

        To the People of the State of New York:

        The remaining powers which the plan of the convention allots to the Senate, in a distinct capacity, are comprised in their participation with the executive in the appointment to offices, and in their judicial character as a court for the trial of impeachments. As in the business of appointments the executive will be the principal agent, the provisions relating to it will most properly be discussed in the examination of that department. We will, therefore, conclude this head with a view of the judicial character of the Senate.

        A well-constituted court...

      • The Federalist No. 66 OBJECTIONS TO THE POWER OF THE SENATE TO SET AS A COURT FOR IMPEACHMENTS FURTHER CONSIDERED
        (pp. 335-339)
        Alexander Hamilton

        To the People of the State of New York:

        A review of the principal objections that have appeared against the proposed court for the trial of impeachments, will not improbably eradicate the remains of any unfavorable impressions which may still exist in regard to this matter.

        Thefirstof these objections is, that the provision in question confounds legislative and judiciary authorities in the same body, in violation of that important and well-established maxim which requires a separation between the different departments of power. The true meaning of this maxim has been discussed and ascertained in another place, and has...

      • The Federalist No. 67 THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
        (pp. 340-343)
        Alexander Hamilton

        To the People of the State of New York:

        The constitution of the executive department of the proposed government, claims next our attention.

        There is hardly any part of the system which could have been attended with greater difficulty in the arrangement of it than this; and there is, perhaps, none which has been inveighed against with less candor or criticised with less judgment.

        Here the writers against the Constitution seem to have taken pains to signalize their talent of misrepresentation. Calculating upon the aversion of the people to monarchy, they have endeavored to enlist all their jealousies and apprehensions...

      • The Federalist No. 68 THE MODE OF ELECTING THE PRESIDENT
        (pp. 344-347)
        Alexander Hamilton

        To the People of the State of New York:

        The mode of appointment of the Chief Magistrate of the United States is almost the only part of the system, of any consequence, which has escaped without severe censure, or which has received the slightest mark of approbation from its opponents. The most plausible of these, who has appeared in print, has even deigned to admit that the election of the President is pretty well guarded.¹ I venture somewhat further, and hesitate not to affirm, that if the manner of it be not perfect, it is at least excellent. It unites...

      • The Federalist No. 69 THE REAL CHARACTER OF THE EXECUTIVE
        (pp. 347-353)
        Alexander Hamilton

        To the People of the State of New York:

        I proceed now to trace the real characters of the proposed Executive, as they are marked out in the plan of the convention. This will serve to place in a strong light the unfairness of the representations which have been made in regard to it.

        The first thing which strikes our attention is, that the executive authority, with few exceptions, is to be vested in a single magistrate. This will scarcely, however, be considered as a point upon which any comparison can be grounded; for if, in this particular, there be...

      • The Federalist No. 70 THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT FURTHER CONSIDERED
        (pp. 354-360)
        Alexander Hamilton

        To the People of the State of New York:

        There is an idea, which is not without its advocates, that a vigorous Executive is inconsistent with the genius of republican government. The enlightened well-wishers to this species of government must at least hope that the supposition is destitute of foundation; since they can never admit its truth, without at the same time admitting the condemnation of their own principles. Energy in the Executive is a leading character in the definition of good government. It is essential to the protection of the community against foreign attacks; it is not less essential...

      • The Federalist No. 71 THE DURATION IN OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE
        (pp. 361-364)
        Alexander Hamilton

        To the People of the State of New York:

        Duration in office has been mentioned as the second requisite to the energy of the Executive authority. This has relation to two objects: to the personal firmness of the executive magistrate, in the employment of his constitutional powers; and to the stability of the system of administration which may have been adopted under his auspices. With regard to the first, it must be evident, that the longer the duration in office, the greater will be the probability of obtaining so important an advantage. It is a general principle of human nature,...

      • The Federalist No. 72 THE SAME SUBJECT (THE DURATION IN OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE) CONTINUED, AND RE-ELIGIBILITY OF THE EXECUTIVE CONSIDERED
        (pp. 365-369)
        Alexander Hamilton

        To the People of the State of New York:

        The administration of government, in its largest sense, comprehends all the operations of the body politic, whether legislative, executive, or judiciary; but in its most usual, and perhaps its most precise signification, it is limited to executive details, and falls peculiarly within the province of the executive department. The actual conduct of foreign negotiations, the preparatory plans of finance, the application and disbursement of the public moneys in conformity to the general appropriations of the legislature, the arrangement of the army and navy, the directions of the operations of war—these,...

      • The Federalist No. 73 THE PROVISION FOR THE SUPPORT OF THE EXECUTIVE, AND THE VETO POWER
        (pp. 370-375)
        Alexander Hamilton

        To the People of the State of New York:

        The third ingredient towards constituting the vigor of the executive authority, is an adequate provision for its support. It is evident that, without proper attention to this article, the separation of the executive from the legislative department would be merely nominal and nugatory. The legislature, with a discretionary power over the salary and emoluments of the Chief Magistrate, could render him as obsequious to their will as they might think proper to make him. They might, in most cases, either reduce him by famine, or tempt him by largesses, to surrender...

      • The Federalist No. 74 THE COMMAND OF THE MILITARY AND NAVAL FORCES, AND THE PARDONING POWER OF THE EXECUTIVE
        (pp. 375-377)
        Alexander Hamilton

        To the People of the State of New York:

        The President of the United States is to be “commander-in-chief of the army and navy of the United States, and of the militia of the several States when called into the actual service of the United States.” The propriety of this provision is so evident in itself, and it is, at the same time, so consonant to the precedents of the State constitutions in general, that little need be said to explain or enforce it. Even those of them which have, in other respects, coupled the chief magistrate with a council,...

      • The Federalist No. 75 THE TREATY-MAKING POWER OF THE EXECUTIVE
        (pp. 378-382)
        Alexander Hamilton

        To the People of the State of New York:

        The President is to have power, “by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided two thirds of the senators present concur.” Though this provision has been assailed, on different grounds, with no small degree of vehemence, I scruple not to declare my firm persuasion, that it is one of the best digested and most unexceptionable parts of the plan. One ground of objection is the trite topic of the intermixture of powers; some contending that the President ought alone to possess the power of making...

      • The Federalist No. 76 THE APPOINTING POWER OF THE EXECUTIVE
        (pp. 382-386)
        Alexander Hamilton

        To the People of the State of New York:

        The President is “tonominate, and, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to appoint ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, judges of the Supreme Court, and all other officers of the United States whose appointments are not otherwise provided for in the Constitution. But the Congress may by law vest the appointment of such inferior officers as they think proper, in the President alone, or in the courts of law, or in the heads of departments. The President shall have power to fill upall vacancieswhich...

      • The Federalist No. 77 THE SAME SUBJECT (THE APPOINTING POWER) CONTINUED AND OTHER POWERS OF THE EXECUTIVE CONSIDERED
        (pp. 386-391)
        Alexander Hamilton

        To the People of the State of New York:

        It has been mentioned as one of the advantages to be expected from the cooperation of the Senate, in the business of appointments, that it would contribute to the stability of the administration. The consent of that body would be necessary to displace as well as to appoint. A change of the Chief Magistrate, therefore, would not occasion so violent or so general a revolution in the officers of the government as might be expected, if he were the sole disposer of offices. Where a man in any station had given...

      • The Federalist No. 78 THE JUDICIARY DEPARTMENT
        (pp. 391-397)
        Alexander Hamilton

        To the People of the State of New York:

        We proceed now to an examination of the judiciary department of the proposed government.

        In unfolding the defects of the existing Confederation, the utility and necessity of a federal judicature have been clearly pointed out. It is the less necessary to recapitulate the considerations there urged, as the propriety of the institution in the abstract is not disputed; the only questions which have been raised being relative to the manner of constituting it, and to its extent. To these points, therefore, our observations shall be confined.

        The manner of constituting it...

      • The Federalist No. 79 THE SAME SUBJECT (THE JUDICIARY) CONTINUED
        (pp. 398-400)
        Alexander Hamilton

        To the People of the State of New York:

        Next to permanency in office, nothing can contribute more to the independence of the judges than a fixed provision for their support. The remark made in relation to the President is equally applicable here. In the general course of human nature,a power over a man’s subsistence amounts to a power over his will. And we can never hope to see realized in practice, the complete separation of the judicial from the legislative power, in any system which leaves the former dependent for pecuniary resources on the occasional grants of the...

      • The Federalist No. 80 THE POWERS OF THE JUDICIARY
        (pp. 400-406)
        Alexander Hamilton

        To the People of the State of New York:

        To judge with accuracy of the proper extent of the federal judicature, it will be necessary to consider, in the first place, what are its proper objects.

        It seems scarcely to admit of controversy, that the judiciary authority of the Union ought to extend to these several descriptions of cases: 1st, to all those which arise out of the laws of the United States, passed in pursuance of their just and constitutional powers of legislation; 2d, to all those which concern the execution of the provisions expressly contained in the articles...

      • The Federalist No. 81 THE SAME SUBJECT (THE JUDICIARY) CONTINUED, AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE JUDICIAL AUTHORITY
        (pp. 406-414)
        Alexander Hamilton

        To the People of the State of New York:

        Let us now return to the partition of the judiciary authority between different courts, and their relations to each other. The judicial power of the United States is” (by the plan of the convention) “to be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may, from time to time, ordain and establish.”¹

        That there ought to be one court of supreme and final jurisdiction, is a proposition which is not likely to be contested. The reasons for it have been assigned in another place, and are...

      • The Federalist No. 82 THE SAME SUBJECT (THE JUDICIARY) CONTINUED
        (pp. 414-418)
        Alexander Hamilton

        To the People of the State of New York:

        The erection of a new government, whatever care or wisdom may distinguish the work, cannot fail to originate questions of intricacy and nicety; and these may, in a particular manner, be expected to flow from the establishment of a constitution founded upon the total or partial incorporation of a number of distinct sovereignties. ‘Tis time only that can mature and perfect so compound a system, can liquidate the meaning of all the parts, and can adjust them to each other in a harmonious and consistent whole.

        Such questions, accordingly, have arisen...

      • The Federalist No. 83 THE SAME SUBJECT (THE JUDICIARY) CONTINUED IN RELATION TO TRIAL BY JURY
        (pp. 418-430)
        Alexander Hamilton

        To the People of the State of New York:

        The objection to the plan of the convention, which has met with most success in this State, and perhaps in several of the other States, isthat relative to the want of a constitutional provisionfor the trial by jury in civil cases. The disingenuous form in which this objection is usually stated has been repeatedly adverted to and exposed, but continues to be pursued in all the conversations and writings of the opponents of the plan. The mere silence of the Constitution in regard tocivil causes, is represented as...

      • The Federalist No. 84 CERTAIN GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS OBJECTIONS TO THE CONSTITUTION CONSIDERED AND ANSWERED
        (pp. 430-439)
        Alexander Hamilton

        To the People of the State of New York:

        In the course of the foregoing review of the Constitution, I have taken notice of, and endeavored to answer most of the objections which have appeared against it. There, however, remain a few which either did not fall naturally under any particular head or were forgotten in their proper places. These shall now be discussed; but as the subject has been drawn into great length, I shall so far consult brevity as to comprise all my observations on these miscellaneous points in a single paper.

        The most considerable of the remaining...

      • The Federalist No. 85 CONCLUDING REMARKS
        (pp. 439-445)
        Alexander Hamilton

        To the People of the State of New York:

        According to the formal division of the subject of these papers, announced in my first number, there would appear still to remain for discussion two points: “the analogy of the proposed government to your own State constitution,” and “the additional security which its adoption will afford to republican government, to liberty, and to property.” But these heads have been so fully anticipated and exhausted in the progress of the work, that it would now scarcely be possible to do any thing more than repeat, in a more dilated form, what has...

      • The Articles of Confederation PREAMBLE
        (pp. 446-455)

        To all to whom these Presents shall come, we the undersigned Delegates of the States affixed to our Names send greeting.

        Articles of Confederation and perpetual Union between the States of New Hampshire, Massachusetts bay, Rhode Island and Providence Plantations, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina and Georgia.

        Article I. The Stile of this Confederacy shall be “The United States of America.”

        Article II. Each state retains its sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and every power, jurisdiction, and right, which is not by this Confederation expressly delegated to the United States, in Congress assembled....

      • The Constitution of the United States of America
        (pp. 456-469)

        We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.

        All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.

        The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several States, and the Electors...

      • AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
        (pp. 470-480)

        Articles in addition to, and Amendment of, the Constitution of the United States of America, proposed by Congress, and ratified by the several States, pursuant to the fifth Article of the original Constitution.

        Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.

        A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear...

  5. Essays

    • Unmanifest Destiny
      (pp. 481-501)
      JOHN DUNN

      The Federalisthas strong claims to be the single most impressive evidence for the impact of consecutive thought on the future shape of human collective life on a truly vast scale. Its own authors had a vivid sense of the stakes for which they were playing and a sober estimate of the many obstacles to their prospective success.¹ Any claim for the scale of its impact would depend on lengthy causal chains, with many links open to plausible dispute, as all such claims must, and could be challenged readily from other angles. Within far more modest confines, its historical title...

    • The Federalist Abroad in the World
      (pp. 502-532)
      DONALD L. HOROWITZ

      The Federalistwas and is, without doubt, an enormously influential work. It explained the rationale for a certain set of institutions, but it did much more. It argued in Number 1 that the array of governmental institutions ought to be a matter of “reflection and choice,” rather than a matter of mere fortuity or inheritance; implicitly, it underscored the need for a written constitution; it provided an exemplar of what might be called comparative constitutional engineering, making the incentives created by various governmental structures the touchstone of critical judgment in that new field;¹ and, of course, it advanced the case...

    • Protofeminist Responses to the Federalist-Antifederalist Debate
      (pp. 533-558)
      EILEEN HUNT BOTTING

      The Federalist Papers(1787–88) contributed to a vital political debate in the early American republic about the benefits and drawbacks of federalism for republican—or what today we call democratic—government.¹ Both then and now, Americans have understood federalism as the division of government and its powers across national and subnational units, with the former overseeing the latter.² From the 1780s onward, however, there has been no final verdict on whether federalism is the best institutional framework for American democracy. At the time of the publication of theFederalist Papers, the debate over federalism was divided into two broad...

  6. Index
    (pp. 559-579)