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Making War and Building Peace

Making War and Building Peace: United Nations Peace Operations

Michael W. Doyle
Nicholas Sambanis
Copyright Date: 2006
Pages: 400
https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt7rtn4
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  • Book Info
    Making War and Building Peace
    Book Description:

    Making War and Building Peaceexamines how well United Nations peacekeeping missions work after civil war. Statistically analyzing all civil wars since 1945, the book compares peace processes that had UN involvement to those that didn't. Michael Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis argue that each mission must be designed to fit the conflict, with the right authority and adequate resources. UN missions can be effective by supporting new actors committed to the peace, building governing institutions, and monitoring and policing implementation of peace settlements. But the UN is not good at intervening in ongoing wars. If the conflict is controlled by spoilers or if the parties are not ready to make peace, the UN cannot play an effective enforcement role. It can, however, offer its technical expertise in multidimensional peacekeeping operations that follow enforcement missions undertaken by states or regional organizations such as NATO. Finding that UN missions are most effective in the first few years after the end of war, and that economic development is the best way to decrease the risk of new fighting in the long run, the authors also argue that the UN's role in launching development projects after civil war should be expanded.

    eISBN: 978-1-4008-3769-4
    Subjects: Political Science

Table of Contents

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  1. Front Matter
    (pp. i-vi)
  2. Table of Contents
    (pp. vii-viii)
  3. List of Figures
    (pp. ix-x)
  4. List of Tables
    (pp. xi-xii)
  5. List of Boxes
    (pp. xiii-xiv)
  6. Acknowledgments
    (pp. xv-xvi)
    Michael Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis
  7. Acronyms
    (pp. xvii-xx)
  8. 1 Introduction: War-Making, Peacebuilding, and the United Nations
    (pp. 1-26)

    The collapse of state institutions in Somalia, a coup in Haiti, and civil wars in Bosnia, Cambodia, El Salvador, Guatemala, and other countries have marked the distinctive contours of civil strife in the past twenty years. The international community’s responses to these emergencies have been, despite sometimes major efforts, mixed at best: occasional successes in restoring a legitimate and effective government are matched by striking failures to do so.

    At the end of the Cold War, the member states of the United Nations (UN) expanded its agenda, defining a near revolution in the relation between what is in the legitimate...

  9. 2 Theoretical Perspectives
    (pp. 27-68)

    Why do some transitions from civil war to civil peace succeed and others fail? Part of the answer can be found in theoretical perspectives on the causes, duration, and termination of civil wars. If the root causes of the war are left untreated, and if the opportunities for rebellion are left intact, then the risk of a failure of the peace is significant. In this chapter, we consider what theories of civil war tell us about the risk of civil war and draw out the implications of these theories for the strategic environment within which UN peace operations function in...

  10. 3 Testing Peacebuilding Strategies
    (pp. 69-143)

    Just as civil war is about failures of legitimate state authority, civil peace is about its successful reconstruction. Peacebuilding strategy is what comes between. Effective strategies must be designed to fit the case if it is going to succeed in building peace. In this chapter, we would like to explain how the triangle of local hostility, local capacities, and international capacities that we previously described favors or disfavors the prospects of sustainable peace.

    The probability that peacebuilding will succeed is a function of a country’s capacities for peace, the available international assistance, and the depth of war-related hostility.² The relations...

  11. 4 Making War
    (pp. 144-196)

    A close reading of Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s June 1992 report, theAgenda for Peace,revealed what would soon become telling phrases. Slipped in among the innocuous bureaucratic prose of the landmark document were references to “peacekeeping,heretofore[emphasis supplied] with the consent of the parties,”¹ a “wider mission” including “nations torn by civil war and strife” and the passing of “absolute and exclusive sovereignty,”² and arguments favoring the establishing of “peace enforcement units . . .available on call[emphasis supplied].”³ Read carefully, this was a revolutionary manifesto. Peacekeeping had long been defined as essentially consent-based monitoring of forces, operations...

  12. 5 Making Peace: Successes
    (pp. 197-256)

    Making a sustainable peace is not unlike making a constitution. Fortunately, the UN has done relatively well in assisting civil-war-torn populations in discovering terms—the “constitutional” external and internal controls—that make a peace agreement sustainable. Like a good constitutionalist, the UN has helped embed external controls, such as democracy and the rule of law, and internal controls, such as power sharing and judicial reform, into effective peace settlements.

    Indeed, the UN’s deficiencies as a war-maker are by and large offset by its often-unappreciated successes as a peace-maker and peacebuilder. The UN has succeeded when it has negotiated and then...

  13. 6 Making Peace: Failures
    (pp. 257-302)

    It will not come as a surprise that it takes much more than an agreement—a truce or a peace treaty—to make a peace. Each of the peace operations we surveyed in the previous chapter, unlike the interventions in Bosnia, Somalia, and the Congo, benefited from an agreement. But so, too, did the peace operations we examine next, the UN’s peacekeeping efforts in Cyprus (United Nations Force in Cyprus, UNFICYP) and Rwanda (United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda, UNAMIR). These operations, too, deployed military peacekeepers and engaged in some civilian peacebuilding activities. What was missing and made these two...

  14. 7 Transitional Strategies
    (pp. 303-333)

    The record of contemporary peace operations does offer lessons, but not simple ones. We have argued that achieving a sustainable peace could broadly be conceived as a triangle, matching the right level and kind of international capacities to the degree of material destruction and to the political hostility that the civil war had wrought. The message is one of variety: Just as civil wars differ, so must the kind and amount of international assistance be different in each case.

    We have drawn two further distinctions of equivalent importance. UN and other peacekeeping operations tend to succeed or fail based on...

  15. 8 Conclusions
    (pp. 334-352)

    Effective peacebuilding depends on good strategy and the availability of adequate resources. And in the end we need to ask whether peace-building delivers value for money and whether there are better alternatives now available.

    Strategies, as we have argued, need to fit the broad parameters of the conflicts—the ecologies—that have characterized recent times. Although there is no recipe for success there are regularly reappearing challenges that must be surmounted if sustainable peace is to be achieved. Some of these challenges come in predictable sequences. These set sequences arose in many of the cases we have examined.

    Any peacebuilding...

  16. Bibliography
    (pp. 353-380)
  17. Index
    (pp. 381-400)