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All Politics Is Global

All Politics Is Global: Explaining International Regulatory Regimes

Daniel W. Drezner
Copyright Date: 2007
Pages: 264
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  • Book Info
    All Politics Is Global
    Book Description:

    Has globalization diluted the power of national governments to regulate their own economies? Are international governmental and nongovernmental organizations weakening the hold of nation-states on global regulatory agendas? Many observers think so. But inAll Politics Is Global, Daniel Drezner argues that this view is wrong. Despite globalization, states--especially the great powers--still dominate international regulatory regimes, and the regulatory goals of states are driven by their domestic interests.

    As Drezner shows, state size still matters. The great powers--the United States and the European Union--remain the key players in writing global regulations, and their power is due to the size of their internal economic markets. If they agree, there will be effective global governance. If they don't agree, governance will be fragmented or ineffective. And, paradoxically, the most powerful sources of great-power preferences are the least globalized elements of their economies.

    Testing this revisionist model of global regulatory governance on an unusually wide variety of cases, including the Internet, finance, genetically modified organisms, and intellectual property rights, Drezner shows why there is such disparity in the strength of international regulations.

    eISBN: 978-1-4008-2863-0
    Subjects: Political Science, Law

Table of Contents

  1. Preface
    (pp. xi-xviii)
    Daniel W. Drenzer

    • CHAPTER ONE Bringing the Great Powers Back In
      (pp. 3-31)

      Globalization is responsible for a lot of bad international relations theory.

      The poor state of theorizing isnotbecause economic globalization is irrelevant. The reduction of traditional barriers to exchange, such as tariffs and capital controls, has introduced a bevy of new conflicts over the residual impediments to global economic integration—the differences among domestic rules and regulatory standards. The affected issue areas include but are not limited to labor standards, environmental protection, financial supervision, consumer health and safety, competition policy, intellectual property rights, and Internet protocols. These differences matter: the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) estimates that...

    • CHAPTER TWO A Theory of Regulatory Outcomes
      (pp. 32-62)

      This chapter lays out the initial assumptions and game-theoretic logic behind the revisionist model of policy coordination. To understand international regulatory regimes, one must understand the preferences and capabilities of great power governments. The approach I develop in this chapter agrees with realists in asserting that state power comes from the size of a government’s internal market. My approach diverges from realism in arguing that government preferences on regulatory standards have their origins in the domestic political economy.

      To be more specific: I posit that government preferences can be derived from the visible adjustment costs that economies face under the...

    • CHAPTER THREE A Typology of Global Governance Processes
      (pp. 63-88)

      Models simplify the world in order to better understand it. The previous chapter used a very simple two-actor model to derive hypotheses about how adjustment costs and market power affect regulatory coordination. However, that model encompassed only governments, and to a lesser extent, domestic and multinational corporations. The actors that many globalization scholars believe to be important in determining the pattern of global governance—international governmental organizations and global civil society—were excluded. What happens when these actors are thrown into the mix?

      This chapter argues that the dynamics of the revisionist model are unaffected by the introduction of new...


    • CHAPTER FOUR The Global Governance of the Internet
      (pp. 91-118)

      The scholarly research on the Internet encapsulates all of the theoretical problems with the literature on globalization and global governance, only in a more concentrated form. For many international relations theorists,thedefining feature of the Internet is that it “overcomes all barriers of territorial distance and borders.”¹ Because the costs of communication are so low on the Internet, nonstate actors can coordinate their activities to a much more sophisticated degree than in the past. Internet sites can be located anywhere in the globe, making it theoretically possible for business and individuals to bypass bothersome regulations. It seems difficult to...

    • CHAPTER FIVE Club Standards and International Finance
      (pp. 119-148)

      Globalization dramatically increased the size and depth of international capital markets. From 1994 to 2002, the valuation of all international debt securities almost quadrupled, from $2.3 trillion to $8.3 trillion. Over the past twenty years, the size of all banks’ cross-border positions increased from $1.4 trillion to $12.7 trillion.¹ The renaissance of global finance led to a concomitant rise in global financial instability:² the frequency of banking and currency crises rose to a level unseen since the interwar years.³ The fallout from these shocks in Latin America, East Asia, Russia, and Turkey triggered fresh demands to strengthen the “international financial...

    • CHAPTER SIX Rival Standards and Genetically Modified Organisms
      (pp. 149-175)

      The previous two chapters demonstrated that even in issue areas where the structural forces of globalization have been thought to be at their strongest—global finance and the Internet—the great powers still dictate when and how global regulatory governance will be effective. When the United States and the European Union faced minimal adjustment costs and recognized the substantial benefits that came with coordination, the establishment of common regulatory and technical standards was swift. In the instances where the regulatory question intersected with broader societal concerns—censorship and privacy rights—the adjustment costs were much higher, and effective coordination did...

    • CHAPTER SEVEN The “Semi-Deviant” Case: TRIPS and Public Health
      (pp. 176-203)

      When the 1994 Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) came into force, NGOs, public health advocates, and transnational activists asserted that the agreement imposed excessive restrictions on access to life-saving drugs in the developing world. The TRIPS accord was thought to be particularly damaging in the treatment of HIV/AIDS, because of the high cost of patented antiretroviral drugs (ARVs). In the late 1990s, these elements of global civil society banded together to push for less stringent IPR enforcement for most countries in the world.

      Soon afterward, both the United States and European Union began softening their stance on the...

    • CHAPTER EIGHT Conclusions and Speculations
      (pp. 204-220)

      If there is a recurring theme that runs through the literature on globalization and global governance, it is that economic globalization attenuates state power. The globalization of production has allegedly splintered the ability of governments to regulate their own economies. Whether the cause is global capital markets, international organizations, or global civil society, new actors are emerging at the expense of states, playing an ever-growing role in determining the pattern of global regulation.

      This book concludes otherwise. The globalization of consumption matters more than the globalization of production; it means that all producers have a vested interest in accessing sizeable...

  4. Afterword to the Paperback Edition
    (pp. 221-230)

    In the year sinceAll Politics Is Globalwas published in hardcover, the salience of regulatory issues in world politics has not abated. Within the academy, there has been a new recognition that regulatory issues have penetrated the traditional negotiating arenas of the global political economy. As Cornelia Woll and Alvaro Artigas observe, “Empirical analysis shows that domestic regulatory policies and international economic policies are no longer independent of each other, as previous models generally assumed.”¹ Recent research has demonstrated the ways in which organized economic interests will advocate for regulatory standards to act as a substitute for more overt...