On 8 August 1950 a full-page recruiting advertisement in the nation’s major newspapers announced: “The Canadian Army Wants Men Now ... to meet aggression in accordance with the United Nations Charter.” Preference would be given to veterans of the Second World War, and the term of enlistment was for eighteen months – “longer if required due to an emergency action taken by Canada pursuant to an International Agreement.”

So began recruitment of the Canadian Army Special Force (CASF), the army’s contribution to the war in Korea. Canada’s navy and air force had quickly been committed to the fighting following the outbreak...

Military training prepares soldiers to fulfil their duties in an operational context as part of a fighting unit. As Richard Holmes observed, “A great part of a man’s behaviour on the battlefield, and hence of the fighting effectiveness of the army to which he belongs, depends upon training.”¹ In order to be truly effective, then, training should be tailored to the theatre of operations in question. Paradoxically, the theatre that exerted the most influence on the direction and substance of Canadian infantry training during the Korean War was Northwest Europe. With few exceptions, the training Canadian soldiers received was predicated...

One of the key factors in soldiers’ combat performance is the quality of their equipment. During the two world wars, this had been based on British designs to the extent that it was often difficult to differentiate Canadian infantry units from their Commonwealth counterparts. In Korea, however, 25th Brigade fighting men were outfitted with a mixture of Canadian, British, and American equipment.¹ Like their predecessors, they carried British-pattern small arms, but this was the first time Canadian troops had used Canadian kit or relied on American support weapons. Thus, the Korean War may be considered a watershed in the technological...

If the soldiers of the 25th Brigade were improperly trained and equipped for battle, they were equally unprepared for the non-combat aspects of service in the Far East. Most possessed only a superficial knowledge of Korea before their deployment, and the 25th Brigade’s shipboard indoctrination program certainly did nothing to improve this. Thus, when the Canadians disembarked from their troopships in wartorn Pusan harbour, they recoiled from the smell, dirt, poverty, and cultural mores that confronted them. By the time they reached the front line, many soldiers in the 25th Brigade had formed the impression that Korea was a God-forsaken...

During their Far Eastern tours the soldiers of the 25th Brigade were in almost continual contact with the men of the Korean Service Corps (KSC), an indigenous service organization that provided porters and labourers to each front-line unit.¹ Later in the war, the soldiers of the third battalions served in combat alongside Korean Augmentation Troops, Commonwealth (KATCOM). Canadian battlefield relations with these two distinct groups of Korean servicemen were characterized by an ambivalence that transcended the immediate concerns of race. While the Canadians generally respected the men of the KSC, the KATCOM were resented and poorly treated. The explanation for...

Combat is a harrowing experience at the best of times. As we have seen, Canadian soldiers in Korea faced the additional hurdles of shoddy equipment and improper training. They also encountered an enemy who was himself well prepared for the type of small-unit, hit-and-run action that was such a feature of the fighting in Korea. Together, these disadvantages undermined battlefield performance and shaped Canadian soldiers’ view of the enemy. Contrary to what the popular historians have claimed, the Canadians did not perform particularly well in Korea.¹ While there were exceptions – notably, the 2 PPCLI’s stand at Kap’yong and the 2...

The indifferent battlefield performance of the 25th Brigade had a pronounced effect on combat motivation or, as John Keegan called it, “the will to combat.”¹ Expected to fight a deadly opponent on what can only be considered unequal terms, a minority of Canadian soldiers became psychological casualties or resorted to self-inflicted wounds as a way out of the combat zone. But what was most remarkable about the Canadian combat experience in Korea was not how many men succumbed to the strain of battle but how many soldiered on in spite of it.

In his scathing indictment of patrolling in Korea,...

Compared with the carnage in the two world wars, Canadian casualties in Korea were extremely light. In only eight hours of fighting at Dieppe, for example, the Canadian Army suffered more than twice as many casualties as it did in the entire Korean War.¹ This was little consolation to the soldiers of the 25th Brigade, who faced death and mutilation on a daily basis. For although the numbers of wounded were far smaller in Korea, the dangers were universal. Men could be cut in half by machine-gun fire, eviscerated by shell fragments, or burned beyond recognition just as surly in...

Despite advances in preventive medicine and the widespread use of antibiotics, many men were incapacitated by disease during their Far Eastern tour. Most of these ailments were easily treated, but others led to painful and ghastly deaths. Nevertheless, the mortality rate from disease was the lowest in Canadian military history.¹ What is significant about the Canadian epidemiological experience in Korea is the number of diseases, ranging from hemorrhagic fever to chancroid, that had rarely been encountered in the past. As a result, the 25th Brigade suffered a disturbingly high number of non-battle casualties, which placed an enormous strain on its...

Compared with their compatriots in the rear, the infantry led a life of extreme hardship and deprivation in Korea.¹ While most support personnel enjoyed three square meals a day, slept in proper beds, and could look forward to such things as regular mail service and the occasional live show, the soldiers in the firing line lived like tramps without even the most basic comforts.

One indication of a soldier’s proximity to the sharp end was the type of food he ate and the manner in which it was consumed. Soldiers in the rear seldom ate prepackaged combat rations, whereas men...

The austere conditions in Korea, coupled with the Department of National Defence’s inability to provide even the most basic comforts to troops in the field, led to the introduction of two policies designed to sustain the morale of Canadian fighting men: annual rotation and rest and recreation (R&R) leave. Neither enjoyed complete success, and as the war dragged on and the ineffectiveness of the official policies became apparent, the officers and men of the 25th Brigade found themselves increasingly reliant on the traditional tonic for military lugubriousness: alcohol.

Morale, the mental attitude and bearing of a group of soldiers, is...

In the evening of 27 July 1953 the guns along the Jamestown line fell silent. It had been a hot, muggy day, with some last-minute desultory shelling in the afternoon. As the sun dipped below the horizon and the hour of the ceasefire approached, the day’s tension gave way to excited anticipation. At 2200 hours sharp, a salvo of flares erupted along the front, officially announcing the end of open hostilities. While the flares hissed and fizzled, the first Asahi beer bottles were prised open to mark the occasion. Many, many more were consumed before the night was through. Gazing,...