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Negotiating Peace: War Termination as a Bargaining Process

Negotiating Peace: War Termination as a Bargaining Process

Paul R. Pillar
Copyright Date: 1983
Pages: 302
https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt7ztnt0
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  • Book Info
    Negotiating Peace: War Termination as a Bargaining Process
    Book Description:

    This work draws on insights from the experimental and theoretical literature on bargaining to provide a much-needed comprehensive treatment of the neglected subject of how wars end. In a study of how states simultaneously wage war and negotiate peace settlements, Paul R. Pillar argues that war termination is best understood as a bargaining process.

    Originally published in 1983.

    ThePrinceton Legacy Libraryuses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These paperback editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.

    eISBN: 978-1-4008-5644-2
    Subjects: Political Science, Sociology

Table of Contents

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  1. Front Matter
    (pp. i-vi)
  2. Table of Contents
    (pp. vii-x)
  3. LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES
    (pp. xi-xii)
  4. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
    (pp. xiii-2)
    P.R.P.
  5. INTRODUCTION
    (pp. 3-10)

    How do wars end? Given the misery and destruction caused by warfare through the centuries, and the impact it has had on human history, the importance of this question seems self-evident. Yet, unlike attempts to explain how wars begin, the effort devoted to understanding how they end has been scant. This book is intended to increase that understanding.

    The book’s subject is in one sense broad, in another sense narrow.

    It is broad insofar as it explores many sides of the fundamental question of how wars end. It is not confined to identifying and describing a moment that marks a...

  6. CHAPTER ONE Patterns of War Termination
    (pp. 11-43)

    An inquiry into the process of negotiating peace must begin by identifying the part that negotiation plays in war termination generally. The present chapter presents a brief but systematic tabulation of past war endings, revealing patterns that suggest how future wars will be likely to end. The tabulation also reveals which past wars can yield the most insights about how peace agreements are likely to be negotiated in the future.

    Following some preliminary remarks about the basis of the tabulation, the first section presents a typology of war endings. The next section uses this typology to summarize how past wars...

  7. CHAPTER TWO The Opening of Negotiations
    (pp. 44-89)

    A peace negotiation has several turning points. The final reaching of agreement obviously is one. There are some others that will be identified in Chapter 3. But the opening of negotiations is surely another. As such, it deserves a separate examination, which is the purpose of the present chapter. Two overall questions are discussed here.

    The first is the question ofwhenpeace negotiations open. In none of the past wars ending with a settlement negotiated prior to an armistice did negotiations take place throughout the conflict. I.e., any prewar negotiations on disputed issues ended when hostilities broke out, and...

  8. CHAPTER THREE The Dynamics of Concession
    (pp. 90-143)

    Negotiating peace while fighting a war entails the use of two different instruments—diplomatic and military—to pursue the same set of objectives. How a belligerent uses each of these instruments depends on how he uses the other, and also on how the enemy uses both of his. This chapter analyzes one aspect of this set of interactions: the effect of each side’s diplomatic behavior on that of the other. The premise is that bargaining behavior at a peace conference is to a significant degree internally determined. That is, each party’s offers are influenced in part by its own previous...

  9. CHAPTER FOUR The Military Instrument
    (pp. 144-195)

    In what ways may armed force be used to support a peace negotiation? In what military and diplomatic circumstances is one usage likely to take precedence over another? And how do these circumstances affect the level of violence employed? This chapter explores these questions and demonstrates how complex military decision-making can be during the negotiation period of a war. In fact, the complexity tends to be even greater than the discussion below suggests, because during this period belligerents may also use their armed forces for purposes other than supporting the negotiation. These other objectives include: preserving and strengthening the military...

  10. CHAPTER FIVE The Diplomatic Response to Military Activity
    (pp. 196-220)

    Combat does not influence diplomacy directly; it does so through the intervening variables of a belligerent’s perceptions, interpretations, and expectations. Peace negotiations thus seldom take the form of simple, straightforward responses to military events. To note this is not to invalidate the reasoning in the previous chapter regarding cost manipulation and other uses of the military instrument, nor is it to suggest that military efforts to affect peace settlements are in general ineffective. But it does mean that the diplomatic response to military activity is fully comprehensible only when considered in the context of all the considerations, discussed in Chapters...

  11. CHAPTER SIX The Manipulation of Multiple Issues
    (pp. 221-235)

    A peace negotiation generally involves several discrete issues. This fact was briefly noted in Chapter 3, in order to make an observation about the usual shape of the overall bargaining space and to introduce a discussion of how individual questions tend to be settled. But the existence of multiple issues also has some other implications, to which we now turn. The subject has been set aside until now because the manipulation of multiple issues becomes most important near the end of a peace negotiation, when the belligerents are searching for ways to bridge the remaining gaps that divide them and...

  12. CHAPTER SEVEN War Termination in Theory and Practice
    (pp. 236-242)

    The theoretical framework with which this book began can now be briefly reconsidered. The primary assumption was that war termination is indeed susceptible to theorizing, and that it can largely be explained in terms of principles that apply to many wars, not just to the issues and circumstances involved in any one of them. This assumption has been borne out by numerous patterns of diplomatic and military behavior that have recurred in past conflicts. The regularity of the patterns is due in part to the fact that most wars have in common certain central features—a conflict of interest, substantial...

  13. APPENDIX A. Lessons for the Statesman at War
    (pp. 245-249)
  14. APPENDIX B. Some Conditions for Nonreciprocation of Concessions by Zeuthenian Bargainers
    (pp. 250-251)
  15. APPENDIX C. Splitting-the-Difference as a Consequence of Zeuthenian Bargaining with Linear Utilities
    (pp. 252-256)
  16. BIBLIOGRAPHY
    (pp. 259-276)
  17. INDEX
    (pp. 277-282)
  18. Back Matter
    (pp. 283-283)