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Federalism, Bureaucracy, and Public Policy

Federalism, Bureaucracy, and Public Policy

Copyright Date: 1980
Pages: 245
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  • Book Info
    Federalism, Bureaucracy, and Public Policy
    Book Description:

    In this book Richard J. Schultz analyses the political process which resulted in a major section of the 1967 National Transportation Act-Part III, which deals with highway transport regulation-never being implemented. In effect, he presents us with a case study of an act that has not become law. In his analysis Professor Schultz employs two models to explain the fate of Part III: the first is the "unitary actor" model, common to the study of Canadian intergovernmental relations; the second is the far less commonly used "bureaucratic politics" model. He finds the first model leaves unanswered too many critical questions, while the second, with its emphasis on the forces that give rise to internal conflict and competition and the consequent colouring this can give to negotiations between governments, offers a more comprehensive explanation of the stalemate that resulted in the shelving of Part III. Using the analysis of the particular case study, the book discusses the broader issues of the underlying dynamics of both intergovernmental and intragovernmental relations in Canada. The study challenges some of the common assumptions about the nature of the policy process within a parliamentary system, and suggests in particular that central agencies may not exercise the degree of control frequently ascribed to them and, more significantly, that power and influence are much more widely dispersed and diffused within our parliamentary system than is generally acknowledged.

    eISBN: 978-0-7735-6076-5
    Subjects: Political Science

Table of Contents

  1. Front Matter
    (pp. i-viii)
  2. Table of Contents
    (pp. ix-x)
  3. Preface
    (pp. xi-xii)
  4. Chronology of Key Dates
    (pp. xiii-xiv)
  5. Commonly Used Abbreviations
    (pp. xv-xvi)
  6. Chapter One INTRODUCTION
    (pp. 1-12)

    The National Transportation Act (NTA) of 1967 promised radical changes in Canadian transportation regulation.¹ All major regulatory functions were assigned to a single agency, a reversal of previous policies and decisions. The railways, for the first time in Canadian history, were to be significantly deregulated. Finally, the federal government, with sole and almost sole authority for air and rail regulation respectively, proposed to extend its regulatory responsibilities to include the highway transport industry. This would be accomplished by rescinding the delegation to the provinces of federal authority to regulate the extraprovincial motor carrier industry.²

    This last change, contained in Part...

  7. Chapter Two Part III: The Issues
    (pp. 13-26)

    If the Canadian experience is a reliable guide, transportation issues are invariably political issues. As with so many issues, the federal system significantly influences the political nature of transportation. It was to be expected, therefore, that Part III would provoke a battle between the federal and provincial governments. The clash involved more than a constitutional tug of war in which the federal government sought to reclaim a function that had been controlled by the provinces for a number of years. Much more basic was the conflict between the federal perspective of the motor carrier industry as an integral component of...

  8. Chapter Three The Federal-Provincial Negotiations: 1966–1970
    (pp. 27-56)

    Part III of the National Transportation Act gave no new powers to the federal government. The Winner decision of 1954 had established that regulation of extraprovincial motor carriers was clearly within federal jurisdiction. Nevertheless, despite its unquestionable, exclusive jurisdiction, the federal government had committed itself to consultation with the provinces before implementing Part III. From 1966 until 1972 consultations and negotiations included two conferences of ministers of transport, one conference of officials, and a series of informal meetings with provincial representatives. The negotiations culminated in a yearlong study by a Federal-Provincial Advisory Council on Motor Carrier Regulation that issued its...

  9. Chapter Four The Federal–Provincial Negotiations: 1971–1972
    (pp. 57-80)

    No one disputes the contention that the 1970 meeting was a failure. However, it is important to determine the extent of this failure. How crucial was it to the eventual failure to implement Part III? This question resolves itself into a number of subsidiary questions. The federal concern was with the impact of this meeting on its strategy for winning provincial cooperation to achieve implementation. Was the provincial animosity engendered by federal behaviour a temporary phenomenon or was it a fundamental roadblock to implementation? The provincial perspective was more complicated. Was the united provincial front merely illusory, created out of...

  10. Chapter Five The Intragovernmental Bargaining: 1967–1971
    (pp. 81-112)

    “I don’t know why you would want to study this matter. It’s like picking up a rotten log to see all the slugs underneath.” Such was the comment of a central federal participant in the negotiations on Part III. The “slugs” to which he referred were not the difficulties encountered with the provinces. They were the lengthy and acrimonious bargaining that characterized the federal government’s efforts to arrive at a policy on the implementation of Part III.

    In contrast to the formalistic view we have of the monocratic nature of the Canadian bureaucracy, an alternative view is that of a...

  11. Chapter Six The Intragovernmental Bargaining: 1971–1973
    (pp. 113-146)

    The creation of the Advisory Council did not end but exacerbated the “pulling and hauling” within the federal government. The Canadian Transport Commission, bitter over what was perceived as a stab in the back by an imperialistic Department of Transport felt seriously threatened by the council, particularly after the council began its deliberations. This conflict differed substantially in two respects from the one within the federal government prior to the creation of the council. First, the informal coalition of the CTC-DOT officials collapsed and the “conspirators,” as J. W. Pickersgill had described them, returned to the fold in order that...

  12. Chapter Seven The Role of Interest Groups: Caught in the Vice of Federalism
    (pp. 147-168)

    The industry journals from which the above statements are extracted are not official spokesmen for the trucking industry, but the opinions are accurate reflections of the change in industry attitude toward the federal government and Part III. After years of strenuous objection to the threat of federal regulation, the industry dramatically reversed itself in endorsing Part III. This reversal was of relatively short duration. There were several reasons for the industry withdrawal of support but the primary reason was the considerable pressure exerted on it. In the manoeuvres of the federal and provincial governments to “influence, bargain with and persuade”...

  13. Chapter Eight Conclusion
    (pp. 169-190)

    We began this study by asking why Part III of the National Transportation Act has not been implemented. Clearly, if we cannot now answer this question with confidence, any other conclusions we might hope to offer will be of questionable value. Fortunately, the evidence documented in the preceding chapters permits us to derive a clear and unequivocal answer. Moreover, despite the rancour and disagreement that surrounded Part III, the answer is one with which the principal actors in the conflict, federal and provincial, are in agreement.

    Part III was indeed the victim of intergovernmental conflict, as successive federal ministers have...

  14. Appendix: Relevant Extracts From NTA
    (pp. 191-198)
  15. Notes
    (pp. 199-218)
  16. Index
    (pp. 219-228)