Throughout the history of moral, political, and legal philosophy, many have portrayed passions and emotions as being opposed to reason and good judgment. At the same time, others have defended passions and emotions as tempering reason and enriching judgment, and there is mounting empirical evidence linking emotions to moral judgment. In Passions and Emotions, a group of prominent scholars in philosophy, political science, and law explore three clusters of issues: Passion and Impartiality: Passions and Emotions in Moral Judgment; Passion and Motivation: Passions and Emotions in Democratic Politics; and Passion and Dispassion: Passions and Emotions in Legal Interpretation. This timely, interdisciplinary volume examines many of the theoretical and practical legal, political, and moral issues raised by such questions.
Subjects: Political Science
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