From the sprawling remnants of the Soviet empire to the southern tip of Africa, attempts are underway to replace arbitrary political regimes with governments constrained by the rule of law. This ideal which subordinates the wills of individuals, social movements--and even, sometimes, democratically elected majorities--to the requirements of law, is here explored by leading legal and political thinkers. Part I of The Rule of Law examines the interplay of democracy and the rule of law, while Part II focusses on the centuries-old debate about the meaning of the rule of law itself. Part III takes up the constraints that rationality exercises on the rule of law. If the rule of law is desirable partly because it is rational, then departures from that rule might also be desirable in the event that they can be shown to be rational. Part IV concentrates on the limits of the rule of law, considering the tensions between liberalism and the rule of law which exist despite the fact that reasoned commitment to the rule of the law is preeminently a liberal commitment. Contributing to the volume are: Robert A. Burt (Yale University), Steven J. Burton (University of Iowa), William N. Eskridge, Jr. (Georgetown University), John Ferejohn (Stanford University), Richard Flathman (Johns Hopkins University), Gerald F. Gaus (University of Minnesota, Duluth), Jean Hampton (University of Arizona), Russell Hardin (University of Chicago), James Johnson (University of Rochester), Jack Knight (Washington University), Stephen Macedo (Harvard University), David Schmidtz (Yale University), Lawrence B. Solum (Loyola Marymount University), Michael Walzer (Princeton University), Catherine Valcke (University of Toronto), and Michael P. Zuckert (Carleton College).
Subjects: Political Science
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