It is certainly not the best of times in East Asia. While it is not quite the worst of times, the current trends point to worsening relations in the region. Part of this dynamic is due to the rise of the People’s Republic of China (China). The rise of China in the region has been remarkable and positive from an economic standpoint, but increasingly unnerving from a security standpoint. Specifically, China is becoming more assertive in enforcing its territorial claims, and the last few years have seen the parallel rise in tensions over China’s territorial claims in both the South...
Not surprisingly, these two disputes have much in common, so much so that national leaders of competing countries look to the other dispute as a harbinger of things to come and/or as a source of lessons learned that can be applied to their own dispute. The presence of China, the nature of the international legal questions, and the natural resources in the regions are commonalities of the two regional disputes.
The East China Sea dispute poses China against Japan in competing sovereignty claims over a set of islets known as the Diaoyus in Chinese and Senkakus in Japanese. This regional...
As relevant as the commonalities are between the two disputes, the differences may carry more weight. They are especially relevant in analysing which dispute is more likely to become a major conflict. These differences are the presence of international legal processes, military capabilities of the claimants, and the bilateral dynamics in the East China Sea versus the multilateral dynamics in the South China Sea.
For the South China Sea, Manila submitted a Memorial to the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in The Hague in March 2014 to rule on several issues. Specifically, pursuant to Annex VII of the UNCLOS the...
Official Chinese policy is to assert “indisputable sovereignty” over the islets in both regions and China is refusing to compromise on issues related to these islets. Beijing does acknowledge a dispute of sovereignty over both the Daioyus/Senkakus and Spratlys, but insists there is no dispute over the Paracels. Much of this is due to a form of nationalism that incorporates a victim identity narrative in it. In spite of, or perhaps because of, China’s increasing wealth and power, many citizens, policymakers and members of the military continue to draw on the so-called “century of humiliation” as the framework for their...
In December 2013 Tokyo approved its new National Security Strategy. It also updated its National Defence Program Guidelines (NDPG) from 2010, along with its five-year Mid-Term Defence Program.17 The NDPG outlines Japan’s defence posture over the next decade while the Mid-Term Defence Program sets out a five-year plan for procuring the necessary capabilities to fulfil the NDPG.18 Chinese naval activity was specifically identified as a concern in Japan’s recent Defence White Paper. The latest NDPG emphasises the increasing incidence of “grey zone” situations over issues such as territory, sovereignty, and economic interests. Japan has traditionally spent the equivalent of one...
The logic of these dynamics points to an Asia arms race: if Japan’s relative military capability is what makes China more cautious in regards to Japan than with Vietnam or the Philippines, then in theory, the only solution to prevent a major conflict is a high quality military, which could doom the region to an on-going arms race of quality to balance China’s quantity.
In the long term, the only true solution to these disputes is for all parties to settle the questions of maritime boundaries and sovereignty via international adjudication. However, given the political realities of the region, particularly...
