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Research Report


Marie-Janine Calic
Nicole Gnesotto
Jane Sharp
Susan Woodward
Edited by Sophia Clément
Copyright Date: May. 1, 1998
Pages: 49
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Table of Contents

  1. (pp. None)
    Sophia Clément

    From December 1995 to December 1996, NATO's first out-of-area deployment, the 60,000-strong IFOR, was tasked with implementing the provisions of the Dayton peace agreement aimed at separating the warring parties in former Yugoslavia and maintaining the cease-fire. The second deployment, SFOR, composed of 35,000 troops, will, over a period of eighteen months, have had the aim of stabilizing what was achieved in the first phase. Whereas more than two years after the deployment of IFOR it has been decided by all of the allies to maintain a presence in Bosnia, the Yugoslav conflict raises two big questions concerning crisis management...

  2. (pp. None)
    Marie-Janine Calic

    More than two years after the signing of the Dayton peace agreement, concerns about the 'unfinished peace' in the Balkans are growing. While most of the military tasks seem to have been successfully completed, many civilian objectives are still delayed. This confirms a general lesson from post-conflict situations: rebuilding war-torn societies and disintegrated states is far more complex, demanding and costly than was bringing an end to hostilities.

    The transformation of a fragile cease-fire into a lasting political settlement in Bosnia and Herzegovina exposes the international community to particular strains and challenges, and requires well-defined policies and effective coordination. This...

  3. (pp. None)
    Nicole Gnesotto

    Two years after the signature of the Dayton peace agreement, assessments of political developments in Bosnia are as ambiguous as the accords themselves. War and peace are still equally probable, and reconciliation is as likely as a break-up or partition. Outside Bosnia, developments are equally contradictory: the international normalization of most of the Balkan republics rivals the increasing risks of violent destabilization in Kosovo in importance. For the international community, and in particular the NATO allies, this simple observation amounts to a commitment.

    Barring any political catastrophe linked to US presidential intimacies, it is more than probable that the member...

  4. (pp. None)
    Jane Sharp

    This paper looks at the prospects for peace in Bosnia through the prism of developments in British policy since the conclusion of the General Framework Agreement (GFA) for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina in late 1995. Britain's diplomatic and military role during the war has been criticized as a policy of appeasement, although David Owen's effort to reach a peace settlement that would preserve the multi-ethnic character of Bosnia and Lieutenant-General Rupert Smith's robust interpretation of the UNPROFOR mandate in 1995 do not fit that pattern.(24) This essay begins with a review of the British role in IFOR and SFOR...

  5. (pp. None)
    Susan Woodward

    When the Clinton administration took control over efforts to end the Bosnian conflict in the summer of 1995, it did so for three reasons: to save NATO, to enter the presidential and congressional election campaign of 1996 with a foreign policy success, and to create conditions which would persuade the Pentagon and the Congress that American combat troops could go to Bosnia safely. Despite the challenge from President Chirac and Prime Minister Major in July to defend the remaining safe areas in Bosnia after the fall of Srebrenica, it was Congressional preparations to lift the arms embargo that made Clinton's...

  6. (pp. None)
    Sophia Clément

    If reintegration appears a difficult undertaking, one that involves the long-term presence of the international community, contributors to this paper are unanimous in their view that the scenario of partition is far from being a guarantee of stability. Only the internal debate in the United States reveals different approaches to this subject. The latter option would give rise to more negative consequences in the long term (such as the radicalization of parties, consolidation of front lines and the necessity for a long-term presence) than positive results. A veritable trap for the international community, it would impose a long-term presence but...