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Research Report

Post-2011 scenarios in Sudan:: What role for the EU?

EDITED BY Damien Helly
Suliman Baldo
Maria Gabrielsen
Fabienne Hara
Damien Helly
Fouad Hikmat
Michael Kevane
Roland Marchal
Tim Murithi
Luke Patey
Copyright Date: Nov. 1, 2009
Pages: 76
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Table of Contents

  1. (pp. 6-8)

    In a forward-looking perspective, the method followed by this report has been to elaborate on four scenarios for Sudan preliminarily identified by other studies: (i) forced unity; (ii) forced secession; (iii) agreed unity; (iv) agreed secession. The idea is to look specifically at the key variables to be taken into account to anticipate the most probable scenarios and to examine which options would bring more benefits than costs to the Sudanese people and their leadership. The report presents the views of a group of Sudan experts which, overall, are strikingly convergent. It thus identifies long-term, mid-term and short-term recommendations for...

  2. (pp. 9-24)

    Imagining scenarios for Sudan’s near and long-term future must begin with an honest assessment of the implementation of the core components of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), as this deal has been the main framework guiding national and international policies in the country. The CPA’s provisions fall into three main categories: those focusing on the central government and national-level reform, those focusing on the South, and those focusing on the transitional areas (Southern Kordofan, Blue Nile and Abyei). Implementation has been uneven across these three categories, with significant implications for the post-2011 period. The state of governance in the North...

  3. (pp. 25-35)

    Since 2007, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) has prioritised self-determination over unity with Northern Sudan, and its solidarity with the Darfuri insurgency has loosened. Consequently, Darfur increasingly has become an issue between Khartoum and the international community, rather than a question discussed on the national agenda. What can we expect for Darfur after 2011? To what extent are the destinies of Darfur and Southern Sudan interlinked? This chapter argues that there is little chance to reach a peace deal on Darfur before Sudan’s 2010 elections. Therefore, the status of Darfur most probably will be negotiated within the framework of...

  4. (pp. 36-51)

    In comparative perspective, Sudan’s macro performance has been good over the past two decades. While growing more slowly than the economies of Indonesia (population: 240 million) and Malaysia (population: 25 million), Sudan (population: 39 million) has grown more rapidly than comparable large African countries such as Kenya (population: 30 million) and Nigeria (population: 130 million). The military regime that took power in 1989, and which is still led by President Omar al-Bashir, restored basic macroeconomic stability to the northern part of the country by the mid-1990s, successfully implemented a military strategy of controlling, developing, and realising profits from the oil...

  5. (pp. 52-65)

    If the EU decides to actively promote dialogue between the various Sudanese parties to implement the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and support the planning of a post-referendum phase, it should coordinate closely with African multilateral organisations and neighbouring states. This chapter examines how this might be possible and under what format.

    The first observation that needs to be made is that the ability of neighbouring countries to influence Sudanese policymakers, particularly with regard to the management of post-referendum issues that may arise, is rather limited. Conversely, there are reasons for neighbouring countries to be concerned about the potential influx of...

  6. (pp. 66-68)

    With the secession of the South from Northern Sudan becoming the most probable scenario, experts agree on the need for the parties to negotiate post-CPA arrangements for peaceful co-existence. These arrangements should cover, apart from agreements on the distribution of oil revenues and in addition to sovereignty transfers in the security and political fields, a range of other economic issues such as water, infrastructure and networks (energy, transport, telecommunications), state-owned industrial assets, remittances, currency and debt. There is also a consensus regarding the need for a high-level united and – most crucially – coordinated international push and follow-up to ensure...