Taiwan’s Export Control System:
Research Report
Taiwan’s Export Control System:: Overview and Recommendations
Melissa Hanham
Catherine Dill
Daniel Salisbury
P. Alex Kynerd
Raymond Wang
Copyright Date: Aug. 1, 2017
Published by: James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS)
Pages: 50
OPEN ACCESS
https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep09910
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  1. Front Matter
    Front Matter (pp. [i]-[i])
  2. Table of Contents
    Table of Contents (pp. [ii]-[ii])
  3. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
    EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (pp. 1-1)
  4. TAIWAN’S EXPORT–CONTROL SYSTEM
    TAIWAN’S EXPORT–CONTROL SYSTEM (pp. 2-16)

    Illicit procurement networks target Taiwan because of its role as a major global supplier of high–tech, dual–use goods and technologies and its unique legal status, which prevents its membership in international organizations and multilateral export control regimes.

    This report identifies key organizations involved in Taiwan’s export control regime, outlines relevant laws and regulations, analyzes prominent cases that highlight trends in violations of Taiwan’s export controls and assist in elucidating illicit procurement networks, and provides recommendations for improving Taiwan’s existing export control regime.

    Incidents involving court cases pertaining to violations of Taiwan’s Foreign Trade Act and media reports reveal...

  5. EXPORT–CONTROL VIOLATIONS 2003–16
    EXPORT–CONTROL VIOLATIONS 2003–16 (pp. 16-30)

    Taiwanese individuals and businesses operating in Taiwan and abroad have engaged in the illicit procurement of dual–use and WMD–related materials and technologies. A search for cases related to violations of Taiwan’s trade laws revealed twelve Taiwan district court cases and numerous media reports involving trade violations. The cases detailed in this report occurred from 2003 to 2015.58

    The trade violations identified in this report involved exports or attempted exports to the DPRK, China, Iran, Libya, and Myanmar. In many of these cases, Taiwanese companies or individuals operating in Taiwan or abroad used Taiwan as a transshipment point, and...

  6. RECOMMENDATIONS
    RECOMMENDATIONS (pp. 30-33)

    Like other transjurisdictional crime, export–control violations do not occur neatly within national borders. This reality presents a special challenge for Taiwan in coordinating measures for the prevention and prosecution of export control violations. Taiwan’s international isolation prevents it from participating in the Treaty on Non–proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, and the Chemical Weapons Convention.

    Furthermore, because Taiwan is not a member of the United Nations, it has no obligation to follow UN Security Council resolutions such as UNSCR1540 or even UN sanctions against North Korea.128 Taiwan also cannot participate in the multilateral export...

  7. APPENDIX I: COMPARISON OF EXPORT–CONTROL REGIMES
    APPENDIX I: COMPARISON OF EXPORT–CONTROL REGIMES (pp. i-iii)
  8. APPENDIX II: TAIWAN’S TRADE STATISTICS: JANUARY 1, 2005–JANUARY 1, 2015
    APPENDIX II: TAIWAN’S TRADE STATISTICS: JANUARY 1, 2005–JANUARY 1, 2015 (pp. iv-iv)
  9. APPENDIX III: KEY LEGISLATION
    APPENDIX III: KEY LEGISLATION (pp. v-viii)
  10. APPENDIX IV: FULL LIST OF CASES
    APPENDIX IV: FULL LIST OF CASES (pp. ix-xiii)
  11. Back Matter
    Back Matter (pp. xiv-xiv)