As the John M. Shalikashvili (Shali) Chair in National Security Studies at The National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR), a role in which I have served since 2007, I participated in the 2008 Carlisle Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) conference entitled “PLA Missions beyond Taiwan.” Throughout my career and most recently as the Shali Chair, I have spent a great deal of time in China meeting with senior defense officials and discussing the security environment in the region. While U.S.‐Sino relations are arguably the best in at least a decade, continued examination of China’s security policy is essential in order...

The volatile year just past will no doubt go down as a milestone for the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and no less so for its People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Two major developments in particular have buffeted the PLA’s ongoing modernization and in the process created an especially fruitful environment for PLA studies. The first development has been the recent warming of relations between Taiwan and mainland China to a degree unimaginable only a few years ago. The second development has been the marked growth and diversification in active PLA missions in 2008, including those resulting from a series of...

This volume examines possible People’s Liberation Army (PLA) missions “beyond Taiwan.” The use of the term “beyond Taiwan” is not meant to imply that Taiwan’s status has been resolved in Beijing’s eyes—let alone resolved to its satisfaction. Rather, the intent is to explore future PLA missions other than Taiwan.¹ Nevertheless, as one explores possible military missions “beyond Taiwan,” an important factor determining the future trajectory of the PLA is how China deals with the island. Rather than directly influencing the kinds of missions identified, or the weapon systems and training China’s military adopts, how Beijing manages Taipei will most...

This chapter examines the understudied topic of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) internal security missions, and the relationship between the PLA’s missions and those of the other organs that make up the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) state coercive apparatus.¹ Although most of the chapters in this volume examine the PLA’s missions beyond Taiwan, beyond China’s borders, or even beyond the confines of earth, this chapter reminds us that so long as the CCP remains in power, the mission which is still perhaps most fundamental to the PLA will remain firmly fixed in China’s domestic society.

How does the PLA’s...

Since the establishment of the People’s Republic of China, (PRC) the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has maintained a relatively cautious and ambivalent stance toward exchanges with foreign militaries.¹ Supporting an independent foreign policy largely free of binding security-related commitments, and steeped in the tradition of self-reliant wariness toward outside powers, the PLA minimized high-profile contact with foreign counterparts.

However, since the beginning of the reform period, and especially since the mid-to late-1990s, the PLA has altered its reclusive approach and actively participated in a broadening range of bilateral and multilateral military engagements throughout the region and around the globe. This...

China’s 2006 national defense white paper (NDWP), officially entitled China's National Defense of 2006, states that China’s defense policy is intended to guarantee maintenance of the country’s “security and unity, and realizing the goal of building a moderately prosperous society.” In a subsequent detailed outline of the key elements of a security strategy to accomplish this, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is tasked with “performing its historical missions” of “providing an important source of strength for consolidating the ruling position of the CPC [Communist Party of China, hereafter referred to as the Chinese Communist Party or CCP],” providing a...

As other chapters in this volume amply attest, “beyond Taiwan” means something substantial to the on-going development of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) capabilities. This is as true of China’s strategic deterrent as of other elements of the PLA. To gain insights into the missions of China’s strategic forces “beyond Taiwan,” this chapter begins with a review of China’s strategic posture. The central element of this posture is China’s force of ballistic missiles tipped with nuclear weapons. But this is not the only element of China’s strategic deterrent force, and a broader view is needed. This chapter summarizes the...

In thinking about the likely missions of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) beyond Taiwan, including the role of space operations, it is important to place Chinese military thinking in its context.¹ The forces and capabilities associated with a Taiwan scenario have constituted a contingency-based assessment. That is, certain capabilities were acquired to deal with the specific Taiwan situation. In a world beyond the Taiwan scenario however that might be achieved, what would be the PLA’s basis for “army-building”?

Recent Chinese writings suggest that the PLA is already thinking along these lines. Jiang Zemin indicated, in a December 2002 speech to...

Theorists in the Chinese military have long been at the forefront of doctrinal thinking about cyber conflict, arguing that computer network attack offers Beijing some important asymmetric advantages against adversaries with superior technology. Yet the actual manifestations of this theorizing have been heretofore restricted to interesting but relatively minor hacking by Chinese patriotic hacker groups during crises or the alleged, large-scale cyber espionage against unclassified Department of Defense (DoD) computer systems. The well-publicized cyber attacks against Estonia in April 2007 and Georgia in July 2008, however, raise the specter of the use of cyberspace for state-level conflict, particularly as globalization...

China’s decisionmakers and scholars are engaged in a wide-ranging discussion regarding future roles and missions for the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in light of an evolving national security environment.¹ Due to China’s ever expanding role in international affairs, this discussion encompasses a much broader array of national security themes than in the past and is heavily focused on determining critical PLA missions beyond Taiwan. While the resolution of the Taiwan issue would certainly clear the way for an expanding review of the PLA’s missions, China’s national security community is actively looking at these missions and weighing long-term strategic interests, resources,...

The underlying assumption of this chapter is that within the limitations of technology and resources, a nation’s military capacity will grow to secure vital national interests. This chapter addresses how the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is poised and exploring ways to secure and defend China’s interests, with specific reference to the Korean Peninsula, Central Asia, and South Asia.¹ A second important assumption implicit in the chapter is that China’s armed forces will not face a major, protracted conflict with or over Taiwan in an attempt to unify that island with the mainland. That is, the Chinese military can “get...