Taking Down Telecommunications
Research Report
Taking Down Telecommunications
Gerald R. Hust
Copyright Date: May. 28, 1993
Published by: Air University Press
Pages: 89
OPEN ACCESS
https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep13951
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  1. Front Matter
    Front Matter (pp. i-i)
  2. Disclaimer
    Disclaimer (pp. ii-ii)
  3. Table of Contents
    Table of Contents (pp. iii-iii)
  4. Abstract
    Abstract (pp. iv-iv)
  5. About the Author
    About the Author (pp. v-v)
  6. CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION
    CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION (pp. 1-4)

    It is easy to find quotations that emphasize the importance and decisiveness of command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I). Although not a panacea target, communications is a target to be attacked or exploited, regardless of the type conflict. Our libraries contain abundant data on C3I and the structures supporting them. However, I challenge any reader to find information on how to target communications. There is simply little available, much less a single source document on the subject.² It is ironic that what allows a military to perform its mission is not seriously analyzed as a target set other than to...

  7. CHAPTER 2 TELECOMMUNICATIONS
    CHAPTER 2 TELECOMMUNICATIONS (pp. 5-37)

    This chapter describes what a modern communications system consists of (to include future trends), identifies its vulnerabilities, outlines various methods to attack it, and provides measures of effectiveness for post attack analysis. This in-depth analysis is important because as force size, spatial dispersion, force complexity, combat tempo, and the need for continuous twenty-four hour operations increase, electro-mechanical devices "become virtually indispensable to the collection, processing, and dissemination of information."² Late information, if only by seconds, can force an opponent into a reactive rather than proactive mode. Information dominance can act as a force equalizer for a weaker power, or enhance...

  8. CHAPTER 3 DISABLING WEAPONS
    CHAPTER 3 DISABLING WEAPONS (pp. 38-56)

    The above scenario may sounds as if it was from an incredulous "sci-fi" novel, however, to others it is reality. The weapon which Cleary describes is within the grasp of today's disabling technologies. America's national science laboratories are among those who recognize this reality and are currently theorizing, developing, and testing these next generation of weapons, thereby transcending the precision guided munitions (PGMs) used in the Gulf War.² Nonlethal technologies are the only way to fully exploit telecommunications, and depending on campaign objectives, they may be cheaper, more effective, and less destructive. In extreme cases, when conventional weapons are prohibited,...

  9. CHAPTER 4 GUIDANCE FOR CAMPAIGN PLANNING
    CHAPTER 4 GUIDANCE FOR CAMPAIGN PLANNING (pp. 57-62)

    Many may think that just because we possess disabling technologies we should use them. Contrary to this view, I suggest a more cautious employment strategy when using them to attack telecommunications. Assuming the technology is available to employ DWs effectively (which it currently is not), one must consider that the US is a nation extremely vulnerable to disabling attacks because of its dependency on information. Any use of these technologies may divulge critical national capabilities that many adversaries could then use against the US. Therefore, they should never be used in a fashion which tips off the enemy to how...

  10. APPENDIX A
    APPENDIX A (pp. 63-72)
  11. APPENDIX B
    APPENDIX B (pp. 73-76)
  12. Bibliography
    Bibliography (pp. 77-84)